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INTRODUCTION
In July 1998, the United States initiated the first of over 320 five-
year "sunset" reviews of existing antidumping and countervailing
duty orders' and suspension agreements2 in force as of the beginning
* Article submitted while the author was Senior Economist to Commissioner
Carol T. Crawford of the United States International Trade Commission. Bates
College, B.A., 1984; Duke University, Ph.D., 1993. The views expressed herein
are the author's own and are not representative of the United States International
Trade Commission, any member or officer of the Commission, or any other em-
ployer. The author thanks Karla Campbell, Gary Badway, and Stefan M. Meisner
for their contributions to this article.
1. Antidumping and countervailing duty laws provide domestic companies
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of 1995. These reviews of "transition orders" will be completed by
the year 2001. Beginning in December 1999, sunset reviews of all
orders and suspension agreements imposed after December 31, 1994
will be initiated no later than thirty days before their fifth anniver-
sary.4 A critical step in these sunset reviews is the early determina-
tion by the United States Department of Commerce ("Commerce")
and the United States International Trade Commission ("ITC" or
"Commission")5 of the adequacy of interest by foreign and domestic
with an opportunity to petition the government for relief in the form of special ad-
ditional duties on imports that are sold at less than fair value ("dumped") or that
benefit from subsidies provided by foreign governments ("subsidized"). See Tariff
Act of 1930 secs. 701, 731, 19 U.S.C. secs. 1671, 1673 (amended 1994) (author-
izing upon successful petition the imposition of antidumping and countervailing
duty orders).
2. Parties involved, through mutual agreement, may suspend antidumping and
countervailing duty investigations before a final determination is made. Details of
suspension agreements vary, but must include an agreement by exporters of the
foreign merchandise to eliminate the unfair practice. See 19 U.S.C. sec. 1673(b)-
(c) (amended 1994) (pertaining to agreements to completely eliminate sales at less
than fair value or to cease exports of merchandise, and to agreements eliminating
injurious effects).
3. See Transition Orders: Final Schedule and Grouping of Five-Year ("Sun-
set") Reviews, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,372, 29,374-82 (1998) (listing 320 scheduled sun-
set reviews). "Transition orders" refer to those antidumping or countervailing duty
orders or suspension agreements originally imposed prior to 1995 and still en-
forced at the time the Uruguay Round Agreements Act ("URAA") took effect on
January 1, 1995. All transition orders are treated as having been issued on January
1, 1995 for purposes of starting the five-year clock, at the end of which a review
must be conducted. Due to the large number of transition orders (401 as of January
1995), the statute granted the United States Department of Commerce ("Com-
merce") and the United States International Trade Commission ("ITC" or "Com-
mission") a three-year period to review such orders, beginning in July 1998. These
orders, which by mid-1998 had fallen to 320 in number, are grouped according to
similarities in products or for administrative efficiency. These groups are being
initiated in weighted average chronological order. See Transition Orders: Final
Schedule and Grouping of Five-Year ("Sunset") Reviews, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,372,
29,374-82 (1998) (listing all transition orders and groupings). Commerce and the
Commission will begin their reviews of non-transition orders in December 1999.
4. See Tariff Act of 1930 sec. 751(c)(1)-(2), 19 U.S.C sec. 1675(c)(l)-(2)
(amended 1994) (requiring a review of a countervailing or antidumping duty order
five years after the order is published and that the review be initiated no later than
the fifth anniversary).
5. The ITC is a quasi-judicial independent federal agency consisting of six
commissioners.
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parties.6 If there is adequate interest in a review, it will proceed to a
full year-long investigation.7 If there is inadequate interest, the re-
view may proceed on an expedited basis." This article examines de-
terminations of adequacy in sunset reviews at Commerce and the
ITC from three different perspectives." First, the article provides a
roadmap of the statutory language and legislative history that under-
lies determinations of adequacy by each of the two agencies. Second,
it examines how the two agencies have explained their practices in
their respective published rules and practices. Finally, the article ex-
plores agency voting patterns, published determinations, and state-
ments of analysis regarding the sixty-one reviews initiated between
6. See 19 U.S.C. sec. 1675(c)(3)(B) (amended 1994) (granting authority to the
agencies to make their respective final determinations on an expedited schedule if
interested parties provide inadequate responses to a notice of initiation); Proce-
dures for Conducting Five-Year ("Sunset") Reviews of Antidumping and Counter-
vailing Duty Orders, 19 C.F.R. pt. 351.218 (1998) (requiring a determination of
adequacy of response from respondent interested parties to a notice of initiation by
Commerce); United States International Trade Commission, Rules of Practice and
Procedure, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,599, 30,608 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 207.62(c)-
(d)) (1998) [hereinafter ITC, Rules of Practice and Procedure]; see also 19 U.S.C.
see. 1677(9) (amended 1994) (defining interested parties as, among others, domes-
tic and foreign producers, trade associations, importers, exporters, and unions in-
volved in the production or shipment of imports under investigation or the corre-
sponding domestic product, as well as foreign governments). Consistent with
Commerce and ITC practices, this article refers to foreign interested parties and
United States importers as "respondent" interested parties. See ITC, Rules of Prac-
tice and Procedure, supra, 63 Fed. Reg. at 30,601 (explaining the ITC's description
of interested parties in sunset reviews); 19 C.F.R. pt. 218(d)(i)-(iii) (explaining re-
quired responses by type of interested party), see also infra note 53.
7. See 19 C.F.R. pt. 351.218(e)(1)(i)-(ii) (providing for a full sunset review
where both domestic interested parties and respondent interested parties provide
adequate responses to Commerce's notice of initiation); ITC, Rules of Practices
and Procedure, supra note 6, 63 Fed. Reg. at 30,608 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt.
207.62(c)) (providing for a full sunset review where both domestic interested par-
ties and respondent interested parties provide adequate responses to the ITC's no-
tice of institution).
8. See 19 C.F.R. pt. 351.218(e)(1)(ii) (providing for an expedited sunset re-
view where respondent interested parties provided inadequate responses to a notice
of initiation); ITC, Rules of Practice and Procedure, supra note 6, 63 Fed. Reg. at
30,608 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 207.62(d)) (allowing for an expedited re-
view where interested parties provided inadequate responses to a notice of initia-
tion).
9. This article also examines agency decision-making regarding whether to
expedite a review if responses are inadequate.
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July 1998 and December 1998 for which adequacy determinations
have been made. In the process, this article identifies analytical ap-
proaches, procedural biases, trends in voting, and other issues that
will assist in the assessment of future determinations of adequacy.
I. BACKGROUND
The use of antidumping and countervailing duty laws is becoming
increasingly pervasive among members of the world trading commu-
nity.' o In 1995, countries bound to the General Agreements on Tariffs
and Trade ("GATT") Antidumping Code numbered only twenty-
five." By the end of 1997, the number of countries notifying the
World Trade Organization ("WTO") of their antidumping legislation
reached fifty-five.'2 In terms of actual use, an annual average of six-
teen countries reported taking definitive antidumping measures to the
WTO from 1995 until 1997, up from an average of eleven countries
from 1992 until 1994, and only seven countries on average from
1987 until 1989 under the GATT. 3 The United States, which has had
10. See generally Philip A. Akakwan, The Standard of Review in the 1994 An-
tidumping Code: Circumscribing the Role of GA TT7 Panels in Reviewing National
Antidumping Determinations, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 227 (1996) (noting the
heightened use of antidumping measures in the past decade).
11. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, THE YEAR IN TRADE 1997: OPERATION OF THE
TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 49TH REPORT, USITC Pub. 3103, at 45 n.129
(May 1998).
12. See id. at 45 (stating that in 1997, fifty-five member countries reported do-
mestic antidumping laws and regulations to the WTO Committee on Anti-
Dumping Practices). Under the Uruguay Round Agreements, the WTO Anti-
dumping and Subsidies Agreements apply to all WTO members, See Agreement
on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994, Apr. 14, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation, Annex 1 A, art. 1, FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 145; Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 14, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1 A, arts. 31-32, FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 229.
In contrast, contracting parties to the GATT were not automatic signatories to the
previous Tokyo Round Agreement on Implementation of Article VI (the anti-
dumping code). Therefore, the pre-URA and post-URA numbers are not strictly
comparable.
13. See Jorge Miranda et al., The International Use of Antidumping: 1987-
1997, 32 J. WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1998, at 5, 34 (providing data on antidumping
measures by country).
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an antidumping law in place since 1916,' has significantly increased
its use of the law. During the twenty-five-year period between 1955
and 1979, the United States initiated 223 antidumping investiga-
tions. 5 During the subsequent twenty-five-year period from 1980 to
1994, the number of antidumping investigations initiated by the
United States had risen to 724.16 The number of outstanding anti-
dumping, countervailing duty orders, and suspension agreements in
the United States increased as well. By the end of 1979, there were
123 orders and suspension agreements in place against foreign im-
ports. 7 By the end of 1994, this number had risen to 401,"M and the
United States established itself as the most frequent user of the anti-
dumping provision.'9 Moreover, once the United States implemented
an order, it did not limit its life span.20 Some orders subject to sunset
reviews have been in effect for over twenty-five years, thereby pro-
viding trade protection for industries that may have changed dra-
matically.
2'
14. See Antidumping Act of 1916, 19 U.S.C. secs. 160-71 (repealed 1979).
15. See Memorandum from Lynn Featherstone, Director of Investigations,
United States International Trade Commission (Oct. 2, 1998) (on file with Lynn
Featherstone, USITC) [hereinafter Featherstone Memorandum] (providing data on
the case history of antidumping investigations over the past several decades). Reli-
able data for countervailing duty investigations initiated from 1955-79 were not
available, therefore no data regarding initiations of countervailing duty ("CVD")
investigations are cited here.
16. See id. at 15.
17. Data is a computation derived from Operation of the Trade Agreements
Program, USITC Pub. 1307 (1982), USITC Pub. 1308 (1982), USITC Pub. 1414
(1983), USITC Pub. 1535 (June 1984), USITC Pub. 1995 (July 1987), USITC Pub.
2894 (July 1995).
18. By the end of 1997, there were 368 outstanding orders and suspension
agreements. See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 11, Tables A-23, A-25, at
183 (listing all outstanding antidumping orders and countervailing duty orders).
19. See Miranda, supra note 13, at 34 (listing data on the most frequent users of
antidumping measures).
20. See Tariff Act of 1930 secs. 701, 731, 19 U.S.C. sees. 1671, 1673
(amended 1994) (providing no time limit for antidumping and countervailing duty
orders).
21. See Bicycle Speedometers from Japan, USITC Inv. No. AA1921-98 (re-
view initiated July 1998) (providing an example of an order that has been in effect
for over twenty-five years). On November 22, 1972, the Department of the Treas-
ury issued an antidumping duty order on imports of bicycle speedometers from Ja-
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The concept of periodic reviews of outstanding antidumping or-
ders22 first appeared in the 1967 GATT Antidumping Agreement and
was subsequently reinforced by the 1979 GATT Antidumping
23Agreement. It was not until 1994, however, following the success-
ful multilateral negotiation of the Uruguay Round Agreements ("the
Agreements"), 4 which established the World Trade Organization and
the accompanying Agreement on Antidumping ("WTO Antidumping
Agreement"),25 that the concept of automatic and mandatory reviews
became fully integrated into the WTO/GATT and the national legis-
lation of all member countries employing antidumping laws. 6 For the
United States, the enactment of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
("URAA") in December 1994 established, for the first time, a
mechanism for automatic and mandatory review or termination of
existing United States antidumping orders.27
pan. 37 Fed. Reg. 24,807, 24,826 (1972). See, e.g., Elemental Sulfur from Canada,
USTIC Inv. No. AA1921-127 (review initiated Jan. 1999) [hereinafter Elemental
Sulfur] (providing an example of an industry that has changed dramatically in na-
ture). These orders were among the very first "transition orders" to be initiated for
sunset review in July 1998.
22. For convenience, the term "antidumping orders" used throughout this arti-
cle refers to antidumping, countervailing duty orders, and suspension agreements,
unless otherwise noted.
23. See Gary Horlick, Remarks at The Brookings Conference, in SHEDDING
LIGHT ON ANTIDUMPING SUNSET REVIEWS 1, 4 (1997) (on file with author) (de-
scribing briefly the events that led up to the United States' acceptance of the 1994
sunset review language). Horlick explains that the United States implementation of
Article 9.1 of the 1979 Agreements was limited to an on-request review, which
placed the burden of persuasion on parties seeking revocation. See id. at 3.
24. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 14,
1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations 145, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
25. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, supra note 12.
26. See Horlick, supra note 23, at 3-4, 8 (discussing the frequency of use re-
garding antidumping laws and the full integration of automatic reviews at the na-
tional and international level); see also Agreement on Implementation of Article
VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 12, art 11.3. Three
of the four historically largest users of antidumping laws, Australia, Canada, and
the European Union-the United States being the absent fourth-already had sun-
set review-type laws in place prior to the 1994 Agreements.
27. See Tarriff Act of 1930, sec. 751(b), 19 U.S.C sec. 1675(b) (amended
1994) (stating that the "changed circumstances" provision provides a mechanism
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The URAA fundamentally changed the antidumping and counter-
vailing duty section of the amended United States Tariff Act of 1930
by requiring Commerce to:
revoke a countervailing duty order or an antidumping order or finding, or
terminate a suspended investigation, unless--(A) [Commerce] makes a
determination that dumping or a countervailable subsidy, as the case may
be, would be likely to continue or recur, and (B) the Commission makes a
determination that material injury would be likely to continue or re-
28
cur....
Thus, statutory responsibility for making sunset review determina-
tions is bifurcated between Commerce and the ITC.' The amended
Tariff Act of 1930 requires that sunset reviews be completed within
one year unless either Commerce, the ITC, or both determine that a
review is "extraordinarily complicated," in which case a review can
be extended for up to a total of six months. 0 Generally speaking, a
review must be completed no later than six-and-a-half years after a
for exporters or producers of subject merchandise under order to request that the
ITC review an order). This section provides for an analysis nearly identical to that
in sunset reviews. The party requesting the review clearly has the burden of per-
suasion and must initially provide evidence that there are changed circumstances
sufficient to warrant revocation. See id. sec. 1675(b)(3) (discussing the elements of
the changed circumstances provision of the Act). Similarly, Section 751(b) pro-
vides for a "changed circumstances" review by Commerce. See id. Again, the bur-
den is on the party, usually foreign, requesting the revocation of the order. See id.
28. 19 U.S.C. sec. 1675(d)(2) (1994).
29. See id. sec. 1675(c) (describing the respective responsibilities of Commerce
and the ITC in sunset reviews). Each review has two identifying investigation
numbers, one for Commerce and one for the ITC.
30. See id. sec. 1675(c)(5)(B)-(C) (outlining the sunset review procedures for
extraordinarily complicated cases).
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final antidumping order is first published,3' thus providing a specific
"sunset" date for an antidumping order.32
II. INITIATION OF REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF
ADEQUACY
The critical first steps in a United States sunset review are the ini-
tiation of the review and the initial assessment of the adequacy of
interest shown by respondent and domestic interested parties in the
review.
United States statute requires Commerce to automatically initiate
sunset reviews no later than thirty days before the fifth anniversary
of the antidumping order by publishing a notice of initiation in the
Federal Register.33 The statute requires interested parties in their re-
sponse to this notice to submit:
31. See id. sec. 1675(c) (providing deadline requirements for sunset reviews).
Duties can remain in effect for nearly seven years, sometimes more, before a five-
year sunset review is completed. Preliminary antidumping duties are often imposed
within four months of the filing of an original investigation, and an investigation
can take up to seven additional months before an order becomes final. The five-
year-review clock does not start until the order is finalized. Approximately four
years and eleven months after an order is finalized, a sunset review is initiated,
which typically takes 360 days to complete, or longer in some extraordinarily
complicated cases. See id.
32. See id. sec. 1675(c)(6)(A)(ii) (providing that "[a] review of a transition or-
der shall be completed not later than 18 months after the date such review is initi-
ated. Reviews of all transition orders shall be completed not later than eighteen
months after the fifth anniversary of the date such orders are issued.").
33. See 19 U.S.C. sec. 1675(c)(2) (amended 1994) ("Not later than 30 days be-
fore the fifth anniversary.... the administering authority shall publish in the Fed-
eral Register a notice of initiation of a review. . . ."). The House report on the
URAA states that "[n]ew section 751(c)(1) [of the Tariff Act of 1930] requires
Commerce and the Commission to conduct a review no later than five years after
the issuance of an antidumping duty order .... ." H.R. Doc. NO. 103-826, pt. 1, at
56 (1994).
In contrast, the only "automatic" requirement in the WTO Antidumping Agree-
ment is that an antidumping order:
[S]hall be terminated on a date not later than five years from its imposition... unless
the authorities determine, in a review initiated before that date on their own initiative
or upon a duly substantiated request made by or on behalf of the domestic industry
within a reasonable period of time prior to that date, that the expiry of the duty would
be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury.
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(A) a statement expressing their willingness to participate in the review
by providing information requested by the administering authority and the
Commission, (B) a statement regarding the likely effects of revocation of
the order or termination of the suspended investigation, and (C) such
other information or industry data as [Commerce] or the Commission may
specify.M
In practice, initiation begins with the simultaneous publication of
the Commerce Notice of Initiation and the Commission Notice of In-
stitution of the sunset review in the Federal Register, which requests
that interested parties provide the information to each agency speci-
fied in the respective notices.3 ' The statute stipulates that if there is
no response by a domestic interested party to the Commerce notice,
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, supra note 12, art. 11.3. Moreover, Article 11.2 states that:
[T]he authorities shall review the need for the continued imposition of the duty, where
warranted, on their own initiative or, provided that a reasonable period of time has
elapsed since the imposition of the definitive anti-dumping duty, upon request by any
interested party which submits positive information substantiating the need for a re-
view.
Id. art. 11.2. By constructing a system of automatic reviews, the United States has
implicitly determined that reviews are "warranted" in every case.
34. 19 U.S.C. sec. 1675(c)(2) (amended 1994).
35. While Commerce has the responsibility for initiating a review, the ITC
publishes its own institution of the review simultaneously with Commerce's initia-
tion notice. Commerce and the ITC request different amounts of information in re-
sponse to their notices. Compare Prestressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand from Ja-
pan, USITC Pub. 3156, Inv. No. AA-1921-188, at 3 (review initiated Feb. 1999)
[hereinafter Prestressed Steel Wire] (specifying the Commission's notice of initia-
tion), with Notice of Five-Year ("Sunset") Reviews, 63 Fed. Reg. 46,385, 46,410
(1998) (describing Commerce's notice of initiation of its sunset review of Steel
Wire Strand from Japan). The statute authorizes both agencies to make informa-
tion requests and to make independent decisions whether to expedite their respec-
tive parts of a review. See 19 U.S.C. sec. 1675(c)(2)-(3) (amended 1994) (author-
izing Commerce and the Commission to undertake sunset reviews). In addition, the
SAA also states that "[b]ecause Commerce and the Commission may require dif-
ferent information from different sources to conduct reviews, the agencies may de-
cide separately whether the responses are inadequate .... " H.R. DOC. No. 103-
316, at 879-80 (1994). The Senate Report similarly states that the Senate Finance
Committee "intends that the two agencies evaluate independently the adequacy of
responses and whether to issue a determination based on the facts available without
further fact-gathering, since each agency will be relying on different information
from different sources to conduct its reviews." S. REP. No. 103-412, at 46 (1994).
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the order under review shall be revoked.36 If the domestic industry
satisfies this minimal standard, but responses are received only from
some but not all domestic and respondent interested parties, the
agencies must each assess whether interested parties have provided
adequate responses.37 The assessment of adequacy is a critical step in
a review because when responses to an agency's information re-
quests are inadequate, the statute provides each agency with the op-
tion to expedite its respective portion of a review. The statute states
that "[i]f interested parties provide inadequate responses to a notice
of initiation, [Commerce] ... or the Commission... may issue,
without further investigation, a final determination based on the facts
available... ,,38 Both agencies assess adequacy on an order-specific
basis, and in the case of the ITC, on a domestic product basis when
appropriate. For example, when there are multiple sunset reviews
involving one type of product imported from multiple countries, each
36. See 19 U.S.C. sec. 1675(c)(3)(A) (amended 1994) (stating that "[i]f no in-
terested party responds to the notice of initiation.... [Commerce] shall issue a fi-
nal determination, within 90 days after the initiation of a review, revoking the or-
der or terminating the suspended investigation to which such notice relates."). This
paragraph pertains only to responses by "domestic interested parties." Id.
37. See Procedures for Conducting Five-Year ("Sunset") Review Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty Orders, 19 C.F.R. pt. 351.218(e)(i) (1998) (setting forth
Department guidelines for determining whether interested parties' substantive re-
sponses to a Notice of Initiation are adequate); ITC, Rules of Practice and Proce-
dure, supra note 6, 63 Fed. Reg. at 30,602-06 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. 207.62)
(setting forth ITC guidelines for determining whether interested party responses to
a Notice of Institution are adequate).
38. 19 U.S.C. sec. 1675(c)(3)(B) (amended 1994).
39. See Procedures for Conducting Five-Year ("Sunset") Review Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty Orders, 19 C.F.R. pt. 351.218 (1998) (explaining Com-
merce's rules and regulations pertaining to sunset reviews); see also ITC, Rules of
Practice and Procedure, supra note 6, 63 Fed. Reg. at 30,605 (to be codified at 19
C.F.R. pt. 207.62(a)) (explaining the ITC's rules and regulations pertaining to sun-
set reviews). The ITC rule states that: "[t]he Commission will assess the adequacy
of aggregate interested party responses to the notice of institution with respect to
each order or suspension agreement under review and, where the underlying af-
firmative Commission determination found multiple domestic like products, on the
basis of each domestic like product." Id. The domestic like product is that product
which is like, or in the absence of like, most similar in characteristics and uses
with, the article subject to investigation. See 19 U.S.C. sec. 1677(10) (amended
1994) (defining domestic like product).
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subject to an antidumping order, adequacy for each order is assessed
independently.
While there is no statutory language regarding what constitutes
adequacy, the legislative history provides guidelines for Commerce
and the ITC to consider when assessing adequacy. First, the agencies
should assess whether there is sufficient willingness among inter-
ested parties to participate and whether there is an adequate indica-
tion they will submit information requested throughout the proceed-
ing'" Second, agencies should assess what proportion of the
interested parties responded and what their likely share of the market
would be if the order were to be revoked.4 ' Furthermore, the legisla-
tive history states that expedited reviews, 2 in which a finding of in-
40. See H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 880 (1994) (discussing adequacy in re-
sponse to notices of initiation). Adequacy should be a measure of a "sufficient
willingness to participate and adequate indication that parties will submit informa-
tion requested throughout the proceeding." Id.
41. See id. Where there are mixed responses with some, but not all, interested
parties responding, "the agencies, in making this decision [whether the responses
are adequate to warrant a full-fledged review], will consider the proportion of par-
ties that respond and their likely share of the market if the order were revoked or
the suspended investigation terminated." Id. The Senate Report adds a cautionary
note that the agencies should "approach these expedited reviews with caution....
The standard for judging the adequacy of information should not be so high as to
lead the agencies to disregard fairly complete information submitted by parties
clearly willing to participate." S. REP. No. 103-412, at 46 (1994). The Senate Re-
port echoes the House Report in stating that when there are mixed responses,
Commerce and the ITC should:
carefully evaluate the shares of the market represented by the responding parties in de-
ciding whether the responses are adequate to warrant a full-fledged review. The Com-
mittee does not intend to establish a strict numerical test for determining adequacy.
Rather, the agencies should evaluate the responses on a case-by-case basis.
Id. The House Report does not provide any guidance regarding the proportion of
responses.
42. The term "expedited review" applies to those sunset reviews conducted un-
der 120 and 150 day schedules at Commerce and the ITC, respectively, based on
the facts available, according to the Tariff Act of 1930. The term "full review" ap-
plies to those reviews conducted under full-fledged 240- and 360-day schedules at
Commerce and the ITC, respectively. See ITC, Rules of Practice and Procedure,
supra note 6, 63 Fed. Reg. at 30,608 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 207.60(b)-(c))
(defining the terms expedited and full reviews); 19 C.F.R. pt. 351.102(b) (defining
the terms expedited and full reviews). Full reviews include full investigatory ac-
tivities by the Commission. H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 879-80 (1994). The same
statutory standards apply to determinations in expedited and full reviews, though
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adequacy is a necessary prerequisite, should promote administrative
efficiency and ease the burden on the agencies by eliminating need-
less reviews while meeting the requirements of the Agreements. 4
III. ADEQUACY ASSESSMENT AT COMMERCE
AND THE ITC: SIMILARITIES
It is instructive to look at how the two agencies have applied this
very general statutory guidance in their regulations and stated prac-
tices regarding adequacy." Consistent with the statute45 and the leg-
they are subject to different standards of judicial review. See 19 U.S.C. sec.
1675a(a)(1) (amended 1994) (citing statutory standards in sunset reviews, includ-
ing both expedited and full reviews); see also id. sec. 1516A(a)(l)-(b)(1)(B) (out-
lining standards of review in expedited and full reviews).
43. See H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 880 (stating that "[n]ew section 751(c)(3) is
intended to eliminate needless reviews," and that "[t]his section will promote ad-
ministrative efficiency and ease the burden on the agencies by eliminating needless
reviews while meeting the requirements of the Agreements.").
44. See 63 Fed. Reg. 13,516, 13,520-25 (1998) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt.
351) (outlining Commerce's interim final rules); Commerce Regulations, 19
C.F.R. pt. 351.218(d)-(e) (1998) (citing Commerce regulations on adequacy). No
subsequent revisions of these interim final rules have been published. It is not un-
common for Commerce to operate under interim final rules for extended periods of
time. For ITC rules and regulations pertaining to sunset reviews, see ITC, Rules of
Practice and Procedure, supra note 6. The typical schedule for assessing adequacy
at the ITC is as follows:
Day 1: Notice of institution of the review is published in the Federal Reg-
ister.
Day 20: ITC receipt of Commerce notification of no domestic interested
party response to initiation (if applicable).
Day 21: Entries of appearance and administrative protective order ("APO")
applications by interested parties due. These provide parties with
procedural rights and permit counsel to interested parties to view
business proprietary information of other parties.
Day 26: Issuance of public and APO service lists.
Day 40: Receipt of Commerce notification of inadequate domestic interested
party response to initiation (if applicable).
Day 50: (1) Responses to ITC notice of institution and party service of these
responses due, and (2) ITC receipt of Commerce notification of in-
adequate respondent interested party response to initiation (if appli-
cable).
Days 50- ITC notices of deficiencies to responding interested parties and
65: opportunity to cure (if applicable).
Day 65: Factual record closes.
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islative history, Commerce regulations provide a mechanism to
quickly eliminate "needless reviews" if there is no response to a
Commerce notice. The regulations state that if no domestic interested
party files a simple "notice of intent to participate" with Commerce
within fifteen days of initiation, Commerce so notifies the ITC on
Day 67: ITC release of APO documents and other data assembled by the
ITC.
Day 75: Comments from parties on adequacy and the appropriateness of an
expedited review are due.
Day 85: Internal agency memos are distributed for consideration by the
Commission.
Day 94: ITC ruling regarding adequacy of interested party responses and
whether to expedite a review.
See ITC, Rules of Practice and Procedure, supra note 6, 63 Fed. Reg. at 30,611
(outlining abbreviated ITC schedule for sunset reviews).
The typical schedule for assessing adequacy at Commerce is as follows:
Day 1: Notice of initiation of review is published in the Federal Register.
Day 15: Domestic notices of intent to participate are due.
Day 20: Notification to the ITC that no domestic interested party has re-
sponded to the notice of initiation (if applicable).
Day 30: Substantive responses by interested parties to the notice of initiation
due.
Day 35: Rebuttals to the substantive responses are due.
Day 40: Notification to the ITC that no domestic interested party has re-
sponded to the notice of initiation (based on inadequate response
from domestic interested parties), if applicable.
Day 50: Notification to the ITC that respondent interested parties provided
inadequate responses to the notice of initiation (if applicable).
Day 70: Comments due on the adequacy of response and appropriateness of
an expedited review.
Day 90: Final determination revoking an order where no domestic interested
party responds to the notice (if applicable).
Day 110: If Commerce finds responses to be inadequate, it will typically issue
this conclusion along with a preliminary result of a full sunset re-
view.
Day 120: If no such preliminary finding is issued, then Commerce will issue
its final results of its expedited review along vith an explanation of
its inadequacy conclusion.
See 63 Fed. Reg. 13,516, 13,524-25 (listing Commerce's schedule for sunset re-
view).
45. 19 U.S.C. sec. 1675(c)(3)(A) (amended 1994).
46. See 19 C.F.R. pt. 351.218 (d)(1)(ii) (1998).
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the twentieth day of the review by public letter. This letter further
notifies the ITC of Commerce's intent to issue a final determination
revoking the antidumping order within ninety days of initiation. No
further substantive work should be undertaken by either Commerce
or the ITC. 4' The substantive responses by interested parties to the
Commerce and ITC notices are not due until Day Thirty and Day
Every notice of intent to participate in a sunset review must include a statement ex-
pressing the domestic interested party's intent to participate in the sunset review and
the following information: (A)... the statutory basis (under section 771(9) of the Act)
for interested party status; (B) A statement indicating whether the domestic producer:
(1) is related to a foreign producer or to a foreign exporter under section 771(4)(B) of
the Act; or (2) is an importer of the subject merchandise or is related to such an im-
porter under section 771(4)(B) of the Act; (C) The name, address, and phone number
of legal counsel or other representative, if any; (D) The subject merchandise and
country subject to the sunset review; and (E) The citation and date of publication in the
Federal Register of the notice of initiation.
Id.
The preamble to Commerce's regulations states that the notice of intent to par-
ticipate procedure "is intended to alleviate the burden on parties of having to pre-
pare substantive responses in cases where there is no domestic party interest in a
particular case." 63 Fed. Reg. 13,517, 13,520-21 (1998).
47. See Notice of Institution, 63 Fed. Reg. 58,619, 58,709 (1998) (indicating
the actual initiation of a sunset review for Brass Fire Protection Equipment). See
e.g., Letter from Barbara E. Tillman, Department of Commerce, International
Trade Administration, to Lynn Featherstone, Director of Investigations, United
States International Trade Commission (Nov. 20, 1998) (on file with Lynn Feath-
erstone, United States International Trade Commission) (regarding Commerce's
intent to issue a final determination revoking the antidumping order on Brass Fire
Protection Equipment from Italy, USITC Inv. No. 73 1-TA- 165 (review initiated
Nov. 1998) [hereinafter Brass Fire Protection]. On Jan. 14, 1999, Commerce pub-
lished a notice that it was revoking this order because no domestic interested party
responded to its notice of initiation by the applicable deadline. See Notice of Final
Results and Revocation, 64 Fed. Reg. 2,471 (1999). Following this notice, the
Commission, pursuant to its Rules of Practice and Procedure, issued a termination
notice. See ITC, Rules of Practice and Procedure, supra note 6, 63 Fed. Reg. at
30,609 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 207.69); see also Refrigeration Compressors
From Singapore: Termination of Five-Year Reviews, 64 Fed. Reg. 4,123 (1999)
(providing notice of termination of ITC's sunset review of Brass Fire Protection);
Brass Fire Protection, supra. It is possible that Commerce could reverse its intent
to revoke before the ninety-day period expires if it reverses its finding that no do-
mestic interested party responded adequately. In such case, Commerce and the ITC
would be compelled to restart their review activity. If necessary, they could invoke
the "extraordinarily complicated" clause of the statute and extend the deadlines for
their respective activities. See 19 U.S.C. sec. 1675(c)(5)(C) (amended 1994) (out-
lining circumstances under which the deadlines may be extended).
1999] SUNSETREVIEWS OF US. ANTIDUMPING ORDERS
Fifty, respectively, following initiation. Accordingly, the initial
screening of domestic industry interest via the notice of intent allows
parties and the agencies to save resources. If even one domestic in-
terested party files a notice of intent to participate, however, the re-
view continues along two separate tracks at Commerce and the ITC.
Here, each agency makes its own threshold findings on the adequacy
of interested party responses to their respective notices. If an agency
finds responses to its notice to be inadequate, it must further deter-
mine whether to proceed with an expedited or a full review. Al-
though Commerce and the ITC are both guided in their consideration
of adequacy by identical language in the statute,"9 they need not agree
on whether to expedite their respective determinations in a review.
This is because each agency makes its own finding under different
regulations and practices and the responses from parties are tailored
to each agencies' notice. 9
In making their respective determinations as to whether to proceed
to an expedited or a full review, Commerce and the ITC have
adopted similar three-stage analytical approaches.' First, each
agency makes an assessment as to the adequacy of each individual
interested party's response to its respective notice of initiation. Sec-
ond, using only those responses that are individually adequate, each
agency considers the adequacy of respondent interested parties in the
aggregate ("respondent group adequacy") and the adequacy of do-
mestic interested parties ("domestic group adequacy") in the agre-
gate. Third, if an agency finds that one or both group responses to its
notice are inadequate, it then decides whether to proceed with an ex-
pedited or a full review. The second and third stages of the building
48. See 19 U.S.C. sec. 1675(c)(3)(B) (amended 1994).
49. For example, Commerce, using its own information requirements and
thresholds, could find that respondent responses are inadequate and proceed with a
120-day expedited review, while the Commission, using different thresholds and
different responses, could find that domestic and respondent responses are ade-
quate, thus automatically proceeding with a full 360-day review.
50. See 63 Fed. Reg. 13,517, 13,523 (1998) (explaining Commerce's analysis
of adequacy); Prestressed Steel Wire, supra note 35 (providing a description of the
ITC's three-stage approach in the views of the Commission). See also ITC, Rules
of Practice and Procedures, supra note 6, 63 Fed. Reg. at 30,602-05 (to be codified
at C.F.R. pt. 207.62) (describing the ITC's approach to assessing adequacy).
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block approach are handled somewhat differently by Commerce"
and the ITC, but each agency takes one of two paths if it finds a
group response to be inadequate: an expedited or full review.
IV. ADEQUACY ASSESSMENT AT COMMERCE
AND THE ITC: DIFFERENCES
A closer look at the two agencies' adopted adequacy procedures
reveals that, despite the similar three-stage analytical approaches to
assessing adequacy, there are stark differences between the two
agencies' practices. This discussion is organized along the lines of
the three-stage analyses conducted by the two agencies, with a side-
by-side comparison of each agency's practice at each stage.
A. INDIVIDUAL ADEQUACY
Responses to each agency's notice provide: (1) an indication of an
interested party's willingness to participate in a review by providing
requested information, and (2) a minimal amount of information for
decision-makers in the event the review is expedited.52 The informa-
tion requested in the responses is a subset of the information that
would be requested if a full review were conducted."
There are a number of differences between the analysis of individ-
ual adequacy at Commerce and the ITC. First, the amount of infor-
51. Commerce will only make these decisions when it determines the respon-
dent group response is inadequate since an adequate response by a single domestic
interested party is considered an adequate response by the entire domestic group.
19 C.F.R. pt. 351.218(e) (1998) (stipulating adequacy of response to a notice of
initiation).
52. During the ITC's period of public comment on its notice of proposed rule-
making for sunset reviews, one commentator argued that nothing in the statute re-
quired the ITC to use detailed data requests as a test of the willingness of interested
parties to participate in a full review. See Letter from Terence Stewart et al., Law
Offices of Stewart & Stewart, to Donna Koehnke, Secretary, United States Inter-
national Trade Commission, 3, 6-7, (Jan. 21, 1998). The Commission, however,
found it useful to do so.
53. Compare Roller Chain from Japan, USITC Inv. No. AA1921-111 (review
initiated July 1998) [hereinafter Roller Chain] (specifying ITC Notice of Institu-
tion of a five-year review concerning antidumping duty order), with ITC Full Re-
view Questionnaires, Roller Chain (1999). See also infra note 60 (discussing addi-
tional information considered by Commerce in full reviews as compared with
expedited reviews).
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mation Commerce requests of respondent and domestic interested
parties,' 4 respectively, is highly unbalanced" while the ITC requests
essentially the same information from both types of interested par-
ties."6 The amount of information requested of interested parties by
54. See Procedures for Conducting Five-year ("Sunset") Reviews of Anti-
dumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 19 C.F.R. pt. 351.218(d) (1998). Com-
merce lists specific criteria for only three types of interested parties: domestic pro-
ducers, foreign producers, and foreign governments.
55. Commerce requires that both respondent and domestic interested parties, at
a minimum, provide the following information: (I) basic contact information, (2)
identification of the subject merchandise and countries involved in the review, (3)
a statement regarding their willingness to participate, including a summary of his-
torical participation in Commerce proceedings related to the order, (4) a statement
regarding the likely effects of revocation, (5) factual information regarding the
likely dumping margins or countervailing duty rates if the order is revoked, (6) a
summary of Commerce's findings regarding duty absorption, if any, and (7) any
relevant scope information. See generally Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Procedures, 19 C.F.R. pt. 351.218(d) (1998). In addition to providing the same in-
formation as domestic interested parties, respondent interested parties are required
by Commerce to provide the following information: (1) the party's individual cur-
rent and historical antidumping margins, (2) the party's volume and value of ex-
ports to the United States for the preceding five years, (3) the party's percentage,
on a volume or value basis, of total exports shipped to the United States, (4) the
volume and value of the party's exports to the United States the year preceding
initiation of the original investigation, (5) interim data for the party's exports to the
United States, specifically the two fiscal quarters of exports for the period preced-
ing the month of initiation, during each of the three years preceding initiation of
the review. Commerce also permits parties to answer several optional questions.
See 19 C.F.R. pt. 351.218(d) (1998). In reviews involving countervailing duty or-
ders, Commerce also requires that foreign governments respond. See 19 C.F.R. pt.
351.218(d) (1998). In CVD reviews, foreign governments are required to submit
the following: (1) statement regarding the likely effects of revocation; (2) factual
information regarding the likely countervailing duty rates if the order is revoked;
(3) any relevant scope information; (4) the original CVD rate and rates in subse-
quent reviews; and (5) the volume and value of subject merchandise exports to the
United States for the preceding five years. See 19 C.F.R. pt. 351.218 (d) (1998).
56. See generally ITC, Rules of Practice and Procedure, supra note 6 (discuss-
ing the Commission's request for information from interested parties in sunset re-
view cases). The ITC requests that each interested party, both respondent and do-
mestic, provide: (1) basic contact information; (2) a statement indicating whether it
is willing to participate in the review by providing information requested by the
Commission; (3) a statement of the likely effects of the revocation of the order,
with specific reference to the statutory factors to be considered by the ITC, in-
cluding likely volume, price effects, and impact if the order is revoked; (4) a list of
all known and currently operating United States producers of the domestic like
product, including the identity of any known related parties; (5) a list of all known
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the ITC falls between Commerce's low requirements for domestic
interested party information and high requirements for respondent in-
formation. The difference in information gathered reflects the differ-
ent analytical approaches taken by each agency in making their re-
spective final sunset review determinations, whether in an expedited
or a full review. Though beyond the scope of this article, a brief ex-
amination of the factors used in Commerce's decision-making re-
garding the likelihood of dumping indicates that Commerce's pri-
mary focus is on foreign behavior,"1 with only a secondary focus on
and currently operating United States importers and foreign producers of the sub-
ject merchandise; (6) a description of significant changes, if any, in the supply and
demand conditions or business cycle in the United States and subject foreign mar-
kets since the original order was imposed, and significant changes, if any, that are
likely to occur within a reasonably foreseeable time (attention to specific supply
and demand factors is requested); and (7) an optional statement whether or not, and
why, the interested party agrees with the given definitions of the domestic like
product and domestic industry, with possible alternative definitions, if any. See id.
The ITC asks one additional question each of domestic producers/unions/trade as-
sociations, United States importers or importer trade association, and foreign pro-
ducers or trade association. Domestic producers are requested to provide quantity
and value of production and shipments as well as an estimate of total domestic
shipments by all producers. United States importers are requested to provide quan-
tity and value information for imports and United States shipments of these im-
ports, as well as an estimate of total imports from subject sources. Foreign produc-
ers are requested to provide quantity and value information for production and
exports to the United States, as well as an estimate of total subject producer pro-
duction and total subject exports. The ITC specifies that an interested party that
cannot furnish the information should explain why. See id. 63 Fed. Reg. at 30,610.
57. See 19 U.S.C. sec. 1675a(c)(1) (amended 1994). This section states that, in
making its determination in reviews of antidumping orders, Commerce "shall [in
general] consider--(A) the weighted average dumping margins determined in the
investigation and subsequent reviews, and (B) the volume of imports of the subject
merchandise for the period before and the period after the issuance of the anti-
dumping duty order or acceptance of the suspension agreement." H.R. DOC. No.
103-316, at 889-90 (1994) (describing important factors relating to foreign behav-
ior, such as trends in exports to the United States); S. REP. No. 103-412, at 52
(1994) (explaining that Commerce should focus on the relationship between
dumping margins and import volumes both before and after issuance of the origi-
nal order). In its published expedited review determinations, Commerce has fo-
cused on trends in import volume and the history of dumping margins during the
life of the order. See e.g., Polychloroprene Rubber from Japan, 63 Fed. Reg.
67,656 (1998) (final admin. review) (providing an example of a final determination
in an expedited review that dumping is likely to recur based on a cessation of im-
ports after imposition of the order and continuing positive margins during the life
of the order).
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other statutory factors." On the other hand, the ITC focuses its in-
quiry on broader market information from both domestic interested
parties and respondent interested parties in determining whether
there is a likelihood of material injury. '9 In expedited reviews, Com-
merce's regulations go even further in the direction of focusing at-
tention on foreign behavior, stating that it will not normally consider
other statutory factors such as price, cost, market, or other economic
factors when it conducts an expedited review."
Second, there are differences in the stated individual adequacy
thresholds applied by each agency, though in practice both agencies
appear to have fairly low thresholds. The ITC states in its Rules of
Practice and Procedure that it intends to evaluate individual inter-
ested party responses to its notice "on a case-by-case basis, rather
than providing specific guidance at this time."' Commerce defines
an individually adequate response as consisting of a complete sub-
stantive response to a notice of initiation. A complete substantive re-
sponse is defined by Commerce as one containing all the information
required of interested parties by the notice of initiaton."z Commerce
considers an inadequate domestic response to be equivalent to no re-
sponse from that party.63
58. See 19 U.S.C. sec. 1675a(c)(2) (1994). This section states that "[i]f good
cause is shown, [Commerce] shall also consider such other price, cost, market, or
economic factors as it deems relevant." Id.; see H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 890
(1994); S. REP. No. 103-412, at 52 (1994).
59. See 19 U.S.C. sec. 1675a(a)(l)-(6) (1994).
60. Commerce regulations state that "[Commerce] normally will consider such
other factors only where it conducts a full sunset review .. " Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Procedures, 19 C.F.R. pt. 351.218(e) (1998).
61. ITC, Rules on Practice and Procedure, supra note 6, 63 Fed. Reg. at
30,602.
62. See Procedures for Conducting Five-year ("Sunset") Reviews of Anti-
dumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 63 Fed. Reg. 13,516, 13,518 (1998) (to
be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 351).
63. Thus, if the only domestic response received in a review is deemed to be
inadequate, Commerce will automatically revoke the order based on a determina-
tion of no response from domestic interested parties. Commerce may also find that
an individually adequate domestic response is essentially inadequate if it is sub-
mitted by a domestic related party; i.e., a domestic producer that is related to a re-
spondent interested party. See 63 Fed. Reg. 13, 516, 13,522 (1998).
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A third difference between the analysis of individual adequacy at
Commerce and the ITC relates to the consequences to individual in-
terested parties of not responding at all to an agency's notice. The
consequences of not responding can be significantly different for
domestic and respondent interested parties at Commerce, but roughly
the same at the ITC, as discussed below in more detail in the evalua-
tion of adequacy practices section.
One would expect that the different adequacy approaches taken by
the agencies would be reflected in the breakdown of responses to
each agency's notice from respondent and domestic interested par-
ties. At Commerce, given the high information burden for individual
respondent interested parties and the low potential payoff from par-
ticipation,' one would expect to see a relatively low response rate
from respondents. In contrast, given the low information burden and
the potential benefits from continuation of the order to domestic in-
terested parties, one would expect to see a relatively higher response
rate on the domestic side at Commerce. As seen in Table 1 below, in
the thirty-two reviews initiated from July 1998 through December
1998 that proceeded beyond the initial screening stage at Commerce,
only ten65 respondent interested party responses covering eight dif-
ferent reviews were submitted to Commerce. On the domestic side,
Commerce has received thirty-four responses covering thirty-two re-
views. 6 In contrast to Commerce, the ITC has received fifty-three re-
64. One practitioner stated that there is a very clear perception among respon-
dents of an institutional bias at Commerce against respondents, and therefore there
is a great reluctance to expend resources toward presenting their case at Com-
merce. See Interview with Attorney Representing Respondent Interests (Apr. 30,
1999); see also discussion infra Part V.
65. In one of these reviews, a respondent interested party received a response
but Commerce did not announce a determination of respondent group adequacy
since it found that sole domestic response to be inadequate, thus triggering revoca-
tion of the order. See Canned Bartlett Pears from Australia, Commerce Inv. A-602-
039 (review initiated July 1998) [hereinafter Canned Bartlett Pears-Commerce].
66. Commerce did not receive any domestic notices of intent to participate in
twenty-nine of the sixty-one reviews initiated between July 1998 and December
1998. See supra note 46 (identifying the ramifications of not filing a "notice of in-
tent to participate"). Since the Commerce deadline for substantive responses from
domestic and respondent interested parties comes after Commerce's decision to
revoke, the interests of respondent interested parties cannot be measured in these
reviews. The only data available for comparison between Commerce and the ITC
is for the thirty-two reviews for which at least one domestic interested party has
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sponses from respondent interested parties covering twelve different
reviews 67 and fifty-five responses from domestic interested parties
covering twenty-eight reviews." The greater similarity in the levels
of responses from respondent and domestic interested parties at the
ITC may be reflective of the relatively greater similarity in standards
for assessing group adequacy at the ITC.69 Overall, as illustrated in
Tables 1 and 2, the ITC has received responses from respondent in-
terested parties in thirty-nine percent of all relevant reviews com-
pared to a twenty-five percent response rate at Commerce.
Despite differences in the two agencies' analyses of individual
adequacy, they have one thing in common: both have found nearly
all individual responses by both respondent and domestic interested
parties to be adequate. 70 As illustrated in Table 1, of the nine re-
sponses received by Commerce from individual respondent inter-
ested parties, Commerce found all nine to be adequate. Furthermore,
Commerce found thirty-three of the thirty-four individual domestic
interested party responses to be adequate. Similarly, as seen in Table
2, the Commission has found all fifty-three responses from individ-
ual respondent interested parties to be adequate and all fifty-five do-
mestic interested party responses to be adequate.7' The Commission
already expressed some minimal interest via its notice of intent to participate. In
this sense, this sample of thirty-two reviews is somewhat biased regarding domes-
tic interest, but can provide useful measures of respondent interested party interest,
particularly on a comparative basis between the two agencies.
67. In grouped reviews, respondents may be submitting fewer responses to the
ITC than would otherwise be the case if they could not "free ride" on complete re-
spouses from interested parties in other countries. See infra note 133 and accom-
panying text (discussing adequacy determinations in grouped reviews and their
outcome).
68. See inzfra Table 2, at p. 1304.
69. See infra Parts [V-V (discussing assessment of group adequacy at Com-
merce and the ITC).
70. The ITC attempts to notify responding interested parties of any perceived
deficiencies in their responses to the ITC notice, consistent with ITC rules. ITC,
Rules of Practice and Procedure, supra note 6, 63 Fed. Reg. at 30,603. Commerce
does not attempt to notify responding interested parties of any deficiencies in their
responses to the Commerce notice but does accept new information from parties in
their rebuttal comments which are due five days after their substantive response are
submitted. See 19 C.F.R. pt. 351.218(d)(4).
71. See Conimission Adequacy Vote Sheets (visited Apr. 20, 1999)
<http://205.197.120.60/oinv/ sunset.nsf/,Veb%5CSunset+ Cases>. See also Notices
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has been, for the most part, in agreement regarding individual ade-
quacy, though several individual Commissioners have found that
certain individual responses were inadequate." In practice," re-
sponses that the Commission has determined to be individually ade-
quate have typically contained all the requested company and market
data, but have contained widely varying responses to the narrative
questions74 regarding likely effects of revocation of an order and the
relevant supply and demand conditions in the ITC notice. Likewise,
responses that Commerce has received from interested parties have
typically contained all the requested data, but have contained widely
varying responses to the Commerce notice's narrative question" re-
76garding the likely effects of revocation.
of Final Results of Expedited Reviews (visited Mar. 6, 1999)
<http://www.ita.doc.gov/import-admin/records/sunset/schedule.htm> (describing
all reviews initiated between July 1998 and December 1999).
72. See infra Table 2, at p. 1304. The statute and legislative history are silent
regarding the outcome of a tie vote on individual adequacy. Section 771 (11) of the
Act, which addresses the consequences of tie votes in other Commission determi-
nations, is not applicable to a Commission decision on whether to expedite a re-
view. Absent specific guidance, the Commission has adopted the practice that
when the Commission is evenly divided regarding the adequacy of an individual
response, that response shall be deemed adequate. See 19 U.S.C. sec. 1677(11)
(1994) (outlining Commission practice on tie votes, but not in sunset reviews).
73. For example, in Iron Construction Castings from Canada, Brazil, and
China, the sole domestic industry respondent, Municipal Castings Fair Trade
Council, provided an eleven-page response regarding likely effects and a four-page
response regarding supply and demand conditions. See Iron Construction Castings
from Canada, Brazil, and China, USITC Inv. Nos. 73 1-TA-262-3, 73 1-TA-262-5
(reviews initiated Nov. 1998) [hereinafter Iron Construction Castings]; Respon-
dent's Brief at 8-18, 25-28, Iron Construction Castings (Dec. 12, 1998). In Roller
Chain, Japanese respondent Sugiyama Chain Company provided a two-page re-
sponse to the likely effects and one page response regarding supply and demand.
See Roller Chain, Respondent's Brief at 2-3, 7 (Aug. 25, 1998).
74. See supra note 56 (identifying questions asked by the ITC in its notice of
institution).
75. See supra note 55 (identifying questions asked by Commerce in its notice
of initiation).
76. For example, in Synthetic Methionine-Commerce, the domestic industry
respondents, Degussa Corporation, Rhone Puulenc, and Novus International, in a
joint response, provided a fifteen-page response to Commerce regarding likely ef-
fects of a revocation order. Synthetic Methionine from Japan, ITA, Inv. No. A-
588-041 (review initiated Aug. 1998) [hereinafter Synthetic Methionine-
Commerce]; Respondent's Brief at 5-21, Synthetic Methionine-Commerce (Sept. 3,
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Table 1
COMMERCE ADEQUACY DETERMINATIONS
For Sunset Reviews Initiated Between July 1998 and December 1998
Description
Number of Sunset Reviews Initiated by Commerce
Number of Sunset Reviews Proceeding to Substantive Response Stage
RESPONDENT (FOREIGN) ADEQUACY
Number of Reviews with No Individual Foreign Responses
Number of Reviews with Individual Foreign Responses
Total Number of Individual Foreign Responses in All Reviews
Total Number of Individual Foreign Responses Found to be Adequate
in All Reviews
Total Number of Reviews Where Adequate Individual Foreign Re-
sponses Were Received but Respondent Group Response Found In-
adequate
Total Number of Reviews Where Respondent Group Responses
Found Inadequate (no response or partial response)
DOMESTIC ADEQUACY
Number of Sunset Reviews with No Domestic Response
Number of Sunset Reviews with Domestic Responses
Total Number of Individual Domestic Responses in All Reviews
Total Number of Individual Domestic Responses Found to be In-
adequate
Total Number of Individual Domestic Responses Found to be
Adequate
Total Number of Reviews Where Individual Domestic Responses
were Received but Found to be Inadequate*
SUMMARY
Number of Reviews (orders) Automatically Revoked Due to No or
Inadequate Domestic Responses
Number of Expedited Commerce Reviews (Based on Respondent
Group Inadequacy) **
Number of Full Commerce Reviews
Source: Department of Commerce
* In one of these Commerce reviews, Canned Bartlett Pears-Commerce, a response was recetved by a
respondent interested party but Commerce did not announce a determination regarding respondent
group adequacy since it found the sole domestic response to be inadequate, thus triggering revocatton of
the order. See supra note 65 (discussing revocation of an order based on a finding of an inadequate re-
sponse).
** Because Commerce finds that a single substantive response from a domestic interested party quali-
fies as an adequate domestic group response, there is strictly speaking no "cvaluation" of domestic
group adequacy and no circumstance in which Commerce would expedite based on domestic group
inadequacy. If Commerce, however, finds that all individual domestic responses that have been re-
ceived are inadequate, it acts as if no domestic response has been received at all and proceeds to revoke
the order.
1998). Conversely, the sole domestic industry respondent in Roller Chain-
Commerce, the American Chain Association, provided a brief page and a half re-
sponse to the likely effects of revocation. See Roller Chain from Japan, Inv. No. A-
588-028, 63 Fed. Reg. 63,026 (1998) (final admin. review) [hereinafter Roller
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Table 2
ITC ADEQUACY DETERMINATIONS
For Sunset Reviews Initiated Between July 1998 and December 1998
Description
Total Number of Reviews Instituted
Number of Reviews Continued Past Initial Com-
merce Stage
RESPONDENT ADEQUACY
Total Number of Individual Respondent (foreign
and U.S. Importer) Responses in All ITC Reviews
Total Number of Individual Respondent Re-
sponses Found to be Adequate in All ITC Re-
views
Number of Reviews with No Respondent Re-
sponses at All
Number of Reviews with at Least One Respon-
dent Response
Number of Reviews With More Than One Indi-
vidually Adequate Respondent Response but
Group Response Inadequate
Total Number of Respondent Group Responses
Found to be Inadequate (no response or inade-
quate group response)
DOMESTIC ADEQUACY
Total Number of Individual Domestic Responses
in All ITC Reviews
Total Number of Domestic Individual Responses
found to be Adequate in All ITC Reviews
Number of Reviews with No Domestic Responses
at All
Number of Reviews with at Least One Domestic
Response
Number of Reviews With More Than One Indi-
vidually Adequate Domestic Response but Group
Response Inadequate
Total Number of Domestic Group Responses
Found to be Inadequate (no response or inade-
quate group response)
SUMMARY
Total Number of Reviews with Either Group In-
adequate
Number of Votes to Expedite ITC Reviews
Based on Respondent Group Inadequacy
Based on Domestic Group Inadequacy
Number of Votes to Proceed to Full ITC Reviews
Despite Respondent Group Inadequacy
Despite Domestic Group Inadequacy












































Source: ITC "NA" = Not Applicable
* This represents the total number of votes cast by the six sitting ITC Commissioners in the 31 reviews
initiated between July 1998 and December 1998 that proceeded past the initial Commerce screening
stage, minus four votes to account for nonparticipation in selected reviews.
** Commissioner Askey refrained from voting on group adequacy in Roller Chain from Japan.
*** Single domestic response filed for multiple countries with same subject imports are counted as one
submission (otherwise count would be 77).
**** Reviews may be expedited based on inadequacies for both groups.
1304
1999] SUNSET REPEWS OF U.S. ANTIDUMPING ORDERS 1305
Table 3
COMMERCE - ITC COMPARISONS
For Sunset Reviews Initiated Between July 1998 and December 1999
Description COMM3ERCE ITC
Total Number of Reviews Initiated 61 61
Number Proceeding to Substantive Response Stage at Commerce and 32 31
ITC
RESPONDENT (FOREIGN)
Total Number of Individual Respondent Responses in All Reviews 10 53
Total Number of Individual Respondent Responses Found Inadequate 0 0
in All Reviews
Total Number of Reviews with more than one Respondent Response 8 12
Number of Inadequate Group Responses 2 1
Number of Adequate Group Responses 5 i1
Number of Reviews Where Respondent Group Responses Found In-
adequate 26 20
Partial Response 2 1
No Response 24 19
DOMESTIC
Total Number of Individual Domestic Responses in All Reviews 34 55
Total Number of Individual Domestic Responses Found Inadequate 1 0
Total Number of Reviews with more than one Domestic Response 32 28
Number of Inadequate Group Responses NA 2
Number of Adequate Group Responses NA 26
Number of Reviews Where Domestic Group Responses Found Inade- NA 5
Partial Response NA 2
No Response NA 3
SUMMARY
Number of Reviews with Domestic or Respondent Group Inadequate 260 20
Number of ReviewsAutomatically Revoked Due to No Domestic Re- 30 NA
sponse
Number of Expedited Reviews 26 10
Based on Respondent Group Inadequacy 26 10
Based on Domestic Group Inadequacy NA 1
Number of Full Reviews 5 21
Despite Respondent Group Inadequacy 0 10
Despite Domestic Group Inadequacy NA 4
Both Group Responses Adequate 5 11
Sources: Commerce and ITC
"NA" = Not Applicable
* Because Commerce finds that a single substantive response from a domestic interested party qualifies
as an adequate domestic group response, there is strictly speaking no "evaluation" of domestic group
adequacy and no circumstance in which Commerce would expedite based on domestic group made-
quacy.
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B. GROUP ADEQUACY 7
In assessing the adequacy of group responses, both agencies con-
sider only individually adequate responses. 78 Beyond this similarity,
the two agencies have taken decidedly different approaches. At
Commerce, the stated thresholds for evaluating the adequacy of re-
sponses from each group are highly unbalanced while those at the
ITC are relatively balanced. At Commerce, a finding that the domes-
tic group response is adequate requires only one individually ade-
quate response by a domestic producer, regardless of this producer's
current or likely share of overall production. 79 For respondent inter-
ested parties, however, Commerce states that it will make its deter-
mination of group adequacy on a case-by-case basis, but that it will
"normally" find a respondent group response to be adequate only
when individually adequate responses are received from foreigners
77. In assessing group adequacy, the ITC relies on all available information on
record, including information from the original investigation, responses to the no-
tice of initiation by interested parties and other parties and nonparties, including
industrial users and consumers, as well as information collected by ITC staff ex-
perts. ITC Commissioners also receive internal agency memos, based upon infor-
mation on the record, from: (1) the Office of Investigations, which includes staff
recommendations on individual adequacy, as well as discussions of group ade-
quacy and whether to expedite a review, and (2) the Office of the General Counsel
which contains a discussion of pertinent legal issues. Commerce relies on informa-
tion from the original investigation, any subsequent reviews, new submissions of
interested parties, submissions of industrial users and consumers, and possibly
other data. See Procedure for Conducting Five-year ("Sunset") Reviews of Anti-
dumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 63 Fed. Reg. 13,516, 13,520 (1998)
(noting specifically the discussion related to 19 C.F.R. pts. 351.308 and 351.312).
78. See Procedures for Conducting Five-Year ("Sunset") Review Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty Orders, 63 Fed. Reg. 13,516, 13,518 (1998) (stating that
in addressing the adequacy of responses in the aggregate, Commerce only consid-
ers those responses that are considered individually adequate); Sorbitol from
France, USITC Pub. 3165, Inv. No. 731-TA-44, at 3 (review initiated Oct. 1998)
[hereinafter Sorbitol] (stating that the Commission makes its group adequacy de-
termination based on those responses deemed individually adequate).
79. Because Commerce finds that a single substantive response from a domes-
tic interested party qualifies as an adequate domestic group response, there is
strictly speaking no "evaluation" of domestic group adequacy and no circumstance
in which Commerce would expedite based on domestic group inadequacy. If
Commerce, however, finds that all individual domestic responses that have been
received are inadequate, it acts as if no domestic response has been received at all
and proceeds to revoke the order. See 19 C.F.R. pt. 351.218(e)(1 )(i) (1998).
1306 [14:1281
1999] SUNSETREVIEWS OF U.S. ANTIDUMPING ORDERS
accounting, on average, for more than fifty percent of the total ex-
ports of subject merchandise to the United States over the five calen-
dar years preceding the review.80 Commerce provides no other guid-
ance regarding its respondent group adequacy standards or what
information it relies on for its decision making, and its published de-
terminations regarding respondent group adequacy provide no addi-
tional guidance beyond the fifty percent threshold."
In the sunset reviews initiated between July and December 1998,
Commerce received responses from respondent interested parties in a
total of eight of the thirty-two reviews that proceeded beyond the
initial Commerce screening phase. As shown in Table I above, two
of these eight reviews were expedited based on inadequate respon-
dent group responses, while five reviews proceeded to full reviews
80. See 19 C.F.R. pt. 351.218(e)(1)(ii) (1998) (explaining Commerce's re-
quirements for an adequate group response for respondents). Commerce has ad-
hered to the Senate Report's admonishment against establishing a strict numerical
test in evaluating adequacy for domestic interested parties, but normally applies a
numerical threshold for evaluating the adequacy of respondent interested party re-
sponses. See S. REP. No. 103412, at 46 (1994) (admonishing against a numerical
tests to assess the adequacy of interested party responses).
81. Commerce has received responses from respondent interested parties in
eight reviews, of which it found adequate respondent group responses in five re-
views and made no finding in one review. See supra note 65 (discussing the revo-
cation of the order pertaining to Canned Bartlett Pears from Australia). Commerce
has published the reasons underlying its assessment of adequacy in two of these
seven reviews. See Roller Chain-Commerce, supra note 76 (discussing respon-
dents' group response, which was found to be inadequate based on less than fifty
percent representation, review expedited); Stainless Steel Plate from Sweden, 63
Fed. Reg. 67,658 (1998) (final admin. review) (discussing respondents' group re-
sponse, found to be inadequate based on less than fifty percent representation, re-
view expedited). The other six reviews are: Canned Bartlett Pears-Commerce, su-
pra note 65 (no finding made regarding respondent group adequacy); Sugar from
the European Union, ITA, Inv. No. C-408-046 (review initiated Oct. 1998) [here-
inafter Sugar from the European Union-Commerce] (specifying Commerce's de-
termination that respondent group response was adequate and is proceeding with a
full review); Sugar and Syrups from Canada, Dept. of Commerce Inv. No. A- 122-
085 (review) (specifying Commerce's determination that respondent group re-
sponse was adequate and is proceeding with a full review); Carbon Steel Wire Rod
from Argentina, Dept. of Commerce Inv. Nos. C-357-004 (review) and A-357-007
(review) (specifying Commerce's determinations that respondent group responses
were adequate and is proceeding with full reviews); Live Swine from Canada,
Dept. of Commerce Inv. No. C-122-404 (specifying Commerce's determination
that respondent group response was adequate and is proceeding with a full review).
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based on adequate respondent group responses." In the remaining re-
view, Commerce found the sole domestic response inadequate, thus
automatically leading to revocation of the review." In the two expe-
dited cases, Commerce's only stated reason for finding the respon-
dent group responses to be inadequate was the failure to meet the
fifty percent respondent group adequacy threshold. 4 In spite of the
emphasis by Commerce on numerical representation," domestic and
respondent interested parties' submissions to Commerce regarding
adequacy have not focused considerable attention on this issue.86
In contrast, the ITC explicitly rejected a single response group
adequacy standard, stating that "a single domestic interested party or
respondent interested party... [filing] an adequate response to the
notice of institution is not per se sufficient indication that either per-
tinent group of interested parties as a whole is interested in a full re-
view." It has also eschewed strict numerical tests in favor of: (1) the
82. See supra Table 1, at p. 1303.
83. See Canned Bartlett Pears-Commerce, supra note 65 (discussing outcome
of Commerce's finding that domestic response was inadequate).
84. See supra note 76 and infra note 86 and accompanying text (identifying
Commerce's findings of inadequacy in reviews of Roller Chain from Japan and
Stainless Steel Plate from Sweden).
85. Numerical representation means the percentage of the industry that is rep-
resented by parties who have submitted responses to a notice of initiation by
Commerce or a notice of institution by the ITC.
86. See, e.g., Roller Chain-Commerce, supra note 76; Stainless Steel Plate
from Sweden, ITA, Inv. No. A-401-040 (review initiated Aug. 1998); Sugar from
the European Union-Commerce, supra note 81; Sugar and Syrups from Canada,
ITA, Inv. No. A-122-085 (review initiated Oct. 1998); Carbon Steel Wire Rod
from Argentina, ITA, Inv. No. A-357-007 (review initiated Nov. 1998); Live
Swine from Canada, ITA, Inv. No. C-122-404 (review initiated Dec. 1998)
(showing that respondents did not focus attention on the numerical representation
of those respondent interested parties that responded). Cf Memorandum from
Scott E. Smith, Office of Policy, United States Department of Commerce, Interna-
tional Trade Administration (Sept. 22 1998) (on file with Central Records Unit,
United States Department of Commerce) (indicating that respondent's percentage
of United States imports "falls significantly below the fifty percent threshold that
the Department normally will consider to be an adequate response" as provided in
section 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(A) of Commerce's rules).
87. ITC, Rules of Practice and Procedure, supra note 6, 63 Fed. Reg. at 30,603.
The lower raw number of domestic responses in all reviews at Commerce relative
to the ITC-34 versus 55-as shown in Table 3, is reflective of the relatively
lower domestic group threshold at Commerce. See supra Table 3, at p. 1304.
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general criterion of a demonstration of a sufficient willingness to
participate and provide information requested, and (2) at least seven
specific criteria that it finds can be relevant to its analysis of group
adequacy."
The first specific criterion is the level of interested party re-
sponses.89 In applying this criterion in its evaluation of the domestic
group response, the ITC focuses on the share of domestic production
represented by the domestic interested party responses, with ade-
quate responses by worker groups being counted as equal to the pro-
duction of the firms at which the workers are employed." In applying
the first criterion in its evaluation of the respondent group response,
88. See ITC, Rules of Practice and Procedure, supra note 6, 63 Fed. Reg. at
30,603-04 (listing criteria one through five).
89. See id. The SAA directs the agencies to "consider the proportion of parties
that respond and their likely share of the market if the order were revoked." H.R.
Doc. No. 103-316, at 880 (1994). The Senate Report directs the agencies to focus
on existing shares in the market. See S. REP. No. 103-412, at 46 (1994). In prac-
fice, Commerce and the ITC appear to have focused on actual shares rather than
"likely" shares. See, e.g., Explanation of Commission Determinations on Ade-
quacy, Iron Metal Castings from India, USITC Inv. No. 303-TA-13 (review initi-
ated Nov. 1998), Heavy Iron Construction Castings from Brazil, USITC Inv. No.
701-TA-249 (review initiated Nov. 1998), Iron Construction Castings, supra note
73 (demonstrating the ITC's use of actual shares); Roller Chain-Commerce, supra
note 76 (demonstrating Commerce's use of actual shares); Stainless Steel Plates
from Sweden, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,658 (1998) (final admin. review) (demonstrating
Commerce use of actual shares).
90. Such "equal" treatment of worker groups can create difficulties for the
Commission in: (1) assessing the willingness to participate and provide informa-
tion among domestic interested party producers, which are critical to any review,
and (2) making determinations in expedited reviews. See ITC, Rules of Practice
and Procedure, supra note 6, 63 Fed. Reg. at 30,603-04 (discussing adequacy re-
quirements for sunset reviews). It is not clear that worker groups can provide even
the basic data on domestic production and shipments requested since they may not
have access to such data. Interested parties are requested by the ITC's notice of
initiation to submit the specified information only if "known." When information
cannot be provided, interested parties are merely asked to provide an explanation
as to why and in what alternative form the information can be provided. See id. at
30,610. These information deficiencies vill be particularly salient in expedited re-
views where respondent interested parties submit inadequate responses and do-
mestic interested parties, based on worker group submissions, provide "adequate,"
though incomplete, responses. Under such circumstances, the Commission may
have little information other than the original determination and minimal ITC staff
research on which to base its determination. In reviews initiated between July 1998
and January 1999, no responses have been received from worker groups.
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the ITC focuses on the share of imports, foreign production, or ex-
ports of the subject merchandise represented by respondent interested
parties. Although it is somewhat unclear from the ITC Rules of
Practice and Procedure which respondent interested parties must re-
spond in order to meet ITC respondent group adequacy requirements,
in practice the ITC has found that adequate levels of responses from
either importers or foreign producers/exporters alone can be suffi-
cient to meet group respondent adequacy. 9'
The remaining six specific ITC group adequacy criteria are all es-
sentially modifiers of the "level of response" criterion. First, the ITC
examines the "structure of the industries in question" in both the
United States and in the foreign country to evaluate, for example,
whether responses would be expected to be high or low due to con-
centrated or fragmented industry structures.92 A relatively low level
of responses in a fragmented industry might still be considered ade-
quate. Second, the ITC examines the prevalence of related parties. If
a domestic interested party is related to a foreign firm under the or-
der, it may have an incentive to forego responding, in the hope that
its nonresponse will lead the ITC to view the domestic group re-
sponse as inadequate. This criterion is designed to take into account
such incentives and to discount nonresponses from such related par-
ties. Third, the ITC examines whether foreign producers are able to
export to the United States. If they cannot, they would not be ex-
pected to respond since they have no economic interest in removal of
the order. Fourth, the ITC examines the extent to which subject im-
ports have been excluded from the United States market by the order
91. In Melamine from Japan, the ITC found that the single response from
United States importer Taiyo America, Inc. was both individually adequate and
represented an adequate "group" response on behalf of respondent interested par-
ties. There were no responses from foreign producers, or exporters or other re-
spondent interested parties in this review. See Melamine from Japan, USITC Inv.
No. AA1921-162 (review initiated Aug. 1998). In Potassium Permanganate from
Spain, the ITC found that the single response from foreign producer Industrial
Quimica del Nalon was both individually adequate and represented an adequate
"group" response on behalf of respondent interested parties. There were no re-
sponses from importers or other responded interested parties. See Potassium Per-
manganate from Spain, USITC Inv. No. 73 I-TA-126 (review initiated Nov. 1998).
92. See, e.g., Live Swine from Canada, USITC Inv. No. 701-TA-224 (review
initiated Dec. 1998) (Statement of the Commission) (explaining that the Commis-
sion considered the fragmented structure of the swine industry).
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or suspension agreement. This factor has been interpreted in two dif-
ferent fashions: (1) to explain why even a one hundred percent re-
sponse rate by importers does not always provide an adequate picture
of respondent interested parties' willingness to participate; and (2) to
explain that even a small number of respondent interested party re-
sponses, particularly importers, can indicate a sufficient willingness
to participate, since more importers would have responded if they
were not blocked by the order.9' Fifth, the ITC examines related party
relationships of foreign producer interested parties in evaluating non-
responses of foreign producer interested parties. If foreign producer
interested parties are related to producers in the United States, they
may have an incentive to maintain the order to minimize competition
for their United States affiliate. By not responding, the order would
have a higher likelihood of remaining in place. This criterion is de-
signed to take into account such incentives and to discount nonre-
sponses from such foreign interested parties. Sixth, submissions by
coalitions, ad hoc industry groups, or trade associations that claim to
represent a given proportion of the domestic or foreign industry may
be discounted. Certain Commissioners have indicated that responses
from such interested parties are not necessarily one-for-one substi-
tutes for responses by individual member interested parties.' The
majority of the Commission, however, appears to accept individually
93. Because an importer must import subject merchandise in order to qualify as
an interested party, prohibitive duties that reduce or eliminate subject imports can
reduce or eliminate this category of interested party. See 19 U.S.C. sec. 1677
(9)(A) (1997).
94. To date, only Commissioners Bragg, Crawford, and Koplan have com-
mented publicly on whether such responses by interested party associations of pro-
ducers can be offered in lieu of individual interested party producer responses. All
three have stressed the need for responses to include information allowing the
Commission to assess whether individual interested parties have a sufficient will-
ingness to participate in the review. See e.g., Stainless Steel Plate from Sweden,
USITC Inv. No. AA1921-114 (review initiated Nov. 1998) (statements of Chair-
man Lynn M. Bragg and Commissioners Carol T. Crawford and Stephen Koplan)
(explaining their views on adequacy). Of the three, only Commissioner Crawford
has stated that she may place less weight on such joint responses, absent clear indi-
cia that the individual members are willing to participate and provide information;
Greige Polyester Printcloth from China, USITC Inv. No. 731 -TA- 101 (review ini-
tiated Feb. 1999) (statement of Commissioner Carol T. Crawford). All Commis-
sioner statements are available at the ITC's homepage on the Internet at <http'./
www.usitc.gov>.
1311
AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
adequate filings by trade associations or groups of producers" as es-
sentially an equivalent to individual interested party responses for
purposes of assessing group adequacy.96
In practice, domestic and respondent parties to reviews and the
Commission have focused considerable attention on the numerical
representation of responses by interested parties in each group and
less attention to discussing the "modifier" factors when addressing
group adequacy considerations. 7 In the twenty-one statements on
adequacy and five opinions issued by Commissioners for reviews
95. In the thirty-one reviews initiated between July and December 1998 for
which Commerce did not announce its intention to revoke due to no initial domes-
tic notices of intent to participate or no adequate domestic response at Commerce,
there have been six responses by trade associations or industry groups representing
either domestic or respondent interests to the ITC notice, with no corresponding
individual interested party responses from producers. See supra note 81 (discuss-
ing adequacy determinations). In all six cases, the trade association responses have
been found by the majority of the Commission to be individually adequate and
have been found to represent an adequate group response. See id.
96. Chairman Bragg has applied yet another "modifier." In Chairman Bragg's
adequacy statement on Melamine from Japan, she indicates that it would be appro-
priate to base her analysis of adequacy on domestic open market sales alone, rather
than all sales (including both open and captive sales). It is not clear whether she
intends to apply this modifier to domestic producers only or whether she would
also apply this modifier to foreign producers. See Melamine from Japan, supra
note 91 (statement of Chairman Lynn M. Bragg) (explaining her view on ade-
quacy).
97. ITC, Rules of Practice and Procedure, supra note 6, 63 Fed. Reg. at 30,603.
In several reviews, domestic interested parties have argued that Commerce
"standing" domestic industry representation requirements in new antidumping pe-
tition filings are an appropriate starting point for group adequacy. See e.g., Sub-
mission of the National Pork Producers Council, Feb. 3, 1999, Live Swine from
Canada, USITC Inv. No. 701-TA-224, at 3 (review initiated Dec. 1998) (affirming
that the analysis of group adequacy should begin with an examination of the do-
mestic industry representation requirements). In filing new antidumping petitions,
the domestic industry must demonstrate that the domestic producers or workers
who support the petition have "standing." To have standing, the petitioning parties
must account for at least twenty-five percent of the total production of the domes-
tic like product, and the domestic producers or workers who support the petition
must account for more than fifty percent of the production produced by that por-
tion of the industry expressing some position for the petition (opposition or sup-
port). See 19 U.S.C. sec. 1673a(c)(4)(A) (amended 1994). The Commission has
explicitly rejected such analogies between standing requirements in original inves-
tigations and group adequacy in sunset reviews in both the its Rules of Practice and
Procedure, and in recent cases. See e.g., Elemental Sulfur, supra note 21, at 5 n. 11
(discussing rejection of the analogy).
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initiated between July and December 1998, eighteen of twenty-one
statements and four-of-five opinions discuss specific or approximate
representation as part of the adequacy analysis," while only eight
statements and none of the opinions discuss "modifier" factors.9
98. For ITC statements, see, e.g., Anhydrous Sodium Metasilicate from France,
USITC Inv. No. 731-TA-25 (review initiated Oct. 1998) [hereinafter Anhydrous];
Sorbitol, supra note 78, at 1 (statement by Commissioner Koplan); Carbon Steel
Wire Rod from Argentina, USITC Inv. Nos. 701-TA-A and 731-TA-157, at 1 (re-
view initiated Nov. 1998) (statement of the Commission); Chloropicrin from
China, USITC Inv. No. 731-TA-130, at 1 (review initiated Nov. 1998) (statement
of Commission); Elemental Sulfur, supra note 21, at 1 (statement of Chairman
Bragg); Greige Polyester Printcloth from China, supra note 94, at 1 (statement of
Commission); Iron Metal Castings from India, USITC Inv. No. 303-TA-12 (review
initiated Nov. 1998) (statement of the Commission); Heavy Iron Construction
Castings from Brazil, Canada, and China, USITC Inv. Nos. 701 -TA-249, 73 1-TA-
262,263, 265, at 1-2 (reviews initiated Nov. 1998) (statement of the Commission);
Melamine from Japan, supra note 91, at 1-2 (statements by Chairman Bragg and
Commissioner Crawford); Polychloroprene Rubber from Japan, USITC Inv. No.
AA1921-129, at 1 (review initiated Aug. 1998); Potassium Permanganate from
Spain, supra note 91, at 1 (statement of Commission); Stainless Steel Plate from
Sweden, supra note 94, at 2 (statement by Chairman Bragg); Sugar from the Euro-
pean Union, Belgium, France, and Germany, and Sugar and Syrups from Canada,
USITC Inv. Nos. 104-TAA-7, AA1921-198-200, 731-TA-3, at 1-3 (review initi-
ated Oct. 1998) (statement of the Commission) [hereinafter Sugar from Five
Countries]; Synthetic Methionine from Japan, USITC Inv. No. AA1921-115, at 1
(review initiated Aug. 1998) (statement of Chairman Bragg) (providing adequacy
requirement information regarding representation in sunset reviews) [hereinafter
Synthetic Methionine]; Live Swine from Canada, supra note 92, at 1-2 (review ini-
tiated Dec. 1998) (statement of the Commission); Frozen Concentrated Orange
Juice from Brazil, USITC Inv. No. 731-TA-326, at 1-2 (review initiated Dec.
1998) (statement of the Commission) [hereinafter Orange Juice from Brazil];
Barbed and Barbless Wire Strand from Argentina, USITC Inv. No. 73 1-TA-208, at
1 (review initiated Dec. 1998) (statement of the Commission); Sebacic Acid from
China, USITC Inv. No. 731-TA-653 (review initiated Dec. 1998). For ITC opin-
ions, see, e.g., Prestressed Steel Wire, supra note 35, at 34 (explaining the Com-
mission's views); Elemental Sulfur, supra note 21, at 3 (explaining the Commis-
sion's views); Pressure Sensitive Tape from Italy, USITC Pub. 3157, Inv. No.
AA1921-167, at 3-4 (Feb. 1999) (explaining the Commission's views); Barium
Chloride from China, USITC Pub. 3163, Inv. No. 731-TA-149, at 3-4 (Mar. 1999)
(explaining the Commission's views).
99. See Roller Chain, supra note 53, at 1-4 (statement of Commissioner Craw-
ford) (regarding trade associations); Melamine from Japan, supra note 91, at 1-2
(statements of Commissioner Crawford and Chairman Bragg) (regarding, respec-
tively, foreign ownership and extent to which imports have been excluded - as it
relates to specialty production, and open market sales); Synthetic Methionine, su-
pra note 98, at 2 (statement of Chairman Bragg) (regarding related parties); Iron
Construction Castings, supra note 73, at 1 & n. I (dissenting footnote by Commis-
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Overall, Commissioners have shown considerable agreement in
their determinations regarding group adequacy. As illustrated in Ta-
ble 4 below, in the thirty-one reviews for which Commissioners have
made group adequacy determinations, Commissioners have been
unanimous in twenty-two instances regarding domestic group ade-
quacy, with only one Commissioner dissenting in eight of the re-
maining nine reviews. Agreement was even stronger regarding re-
spondent group adequacy. As indicated in Table 5 below,
Commissioners were unanimous in twenty-nine of thirty-one in-
stances regarding respondent group adequacy.'0o About two-thirds of
these adequacy determinations, however, have been based on zero or
near-one hundred percent response rates. Few reviews have involved
"gray area" response rates. Nonetheless, given the focus on numeri-
cal representation in adequacy determinations to date, it would be
useful to identify what numerical thresholds the Commission might
typically rely on, if any. Although it is too early to identify a defini-
tive pattern, a preliminary examination of the group response levels
by interested parties and the voting patterns of the ITC regarding
group adequacy, as shown in Tables 4 and 5, suggests that the Com-
mission will be reluctant to find group responses to be inadequate
when the response rate is above approximately one-third.''
sioner Crawford in statement of Commission) (regarding trade associations);
Greige Polyester Printcloth from China, supra note 94, at I (statement of Commis-
sioner Crawford) (regarding trade associations); Live Swine from Canada, supra
note 92, at 1-2 (review initiated Dec. 1998) (statement of the Commission) (dis-
cussing the fragmented industry); Orange Juice from Brazil, supra note 98, at 2-3
(dissent by Commissioner Crawford in statement of the Commission) (regarding
trade associations).
100. See U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Five-Year (Sunset) Reviews (visited June 4,
1999) <http://205.197.120.60/oinv/sunset.nsf> (providing a list of the vote summa-
ries for adequacy determinations for sunset reviews). The statute and legislative
history provide no direction regarding tie votes on group adequacy. Absent guid-
ance, the Commission has adopted the practice that when the Commission is
evenly divided regarding the adequacy of a group response, that group's response
shall be deemed adequate. See also supra note 75 and accompanying text (show-
ing that Commerce nearly always finds responses adequate).
101. See infra Tables 4 and 5, at pp. 1320-23; see also Interviews with United
States International Trade Commission Officials (May 10, 1999) (expressing
agreement with this tentative conclusion).
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C. EXPEDITED OR FULL REVIEW
When one or both group responses have been found to be inade-
quate, the two agencies treat the question of whether to proceed to an
expedited or full review differently. The Commerce sunset rules state
that Commerce will "normally" conduct an expedited review when it
determines that respondent interested parties have provided inade-
quate responses. 2 Commerce has not, however, articulated any cir-
cumstances in which it would proceed with a full review when it has
found that the respondent group response is inadequate. As shown in
Table 3, Commerce has expedited all twenty-six reviews in which it
has found the respondent group response to be inadequate.'" Given
this early experience, it remains to be seen whether Commerce will
ever choose to proceed to a full review when it determines that the
respondent group response is inadequate. The question of whether to
proceed to a full review is not relevant to Commerce's analysis of
domestic group adequacy since Commerce sunset rules require only
a single individually adequate domestic response to find the domestic
group adequate. When there is no adequate individual domestic re-
sponse to Commerce's notice, the review is automatically termi-
nated.' 4
In contrast, the process at the ITC has been relatively transparent,
if not fully vetted. In its Rules of Practice and Procedure, the ITC
articulated two circumstances in which it may exercise its discretion
to conduct a full review notwithstanding inadequate group responses.
First, in grouped reviews involving several countries, "where aggre-
102. Commerce rules state that if it determines that respondent interested parties
provided inadequate responses to a notice of initiation, it will "[niormally conduct
an expedited sunset review. .. ." 19 C.F.R. pt. 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C) (1998). As
noted, the statute merely provides the discretion to proceed to a full review, even if
responses are inadequate and does not provide any preferred outcome. Id. How-
ever, Commerce's practices comport with the SAA, which states that "if there is
inadequate response to a notice of initiation by foreign and domestic interested
parties, Commerce and the Commission will conduct an expedited review based on
the facts available.. .." H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 879 (1994) [emphasis added].
103. See supra Table 3, at p. 1305; U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Sunset Schedule
(visited June 3, 1999) <http://wwwv.ita.doc.gov/importadminrecordslsunset/sche-
dule.htm> (posting sunset reviews issued by Commerce).
104. See discussion supra note 63 (describing situations under which Commerce
could find inadequate domestic response and the consequences of such a finding).
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gate domestic responses are not inadequate and responses from the
respondent interested parties are adequate with respect to some of the
countries in the group but inadequate with respect to others, the
Commission will normally conduct full reviews for all countries in
the group."'' 5 Second, where there are significant domestic like prod-
uct issues in a review, "[s]hould the Commission determine that
there is a need in the five-year review to re-examine the domestic
like product definition made in the original determination, it may
determine to conduct a full review even in circumstances when do-
mestic and/or respondent interested party responses are inade-
quate. ' 1°6 There is also a third circumstance, somewhat related to the
like product issue, that has been considered by at least one Commis-
sioner and raises an important issue, namely, whether a lack of in-
formation is grounds for proceeding to a full review despite inade-
quate responses.107
The first circumstance ("mixed responses circumstance") has been
applied ostensibly to "promote administrative efficiency." For exam-
ple, in Potassium Permanganate from China, the Commission ma-
jority found that, despite inadequate responses by respondent inter-
ested parties, "[t]he Commission... determined to conduct a full
review . .. because conducting a full review would promote admin-
istrative efficiency in light of the Commission's decision to conduct
a full review with respect to Potassium Permanganate from
Spain."'"° The ITC's intention to "normally" proceed to full reviews
105. ITC, Rules of Practice and Procedure, supra note 6, 63 Fed. Reg. at 30,604.
106. Id.
107. See Sorbitol, supra note 78, at 1; Anhydrous, supra note 98, at 1 (statement
of Commissioner Stephen Koplan) (explaining his view on adequacy for Sorbitol
and Anhydrous).
[Commissioner Koplan] voted to conduct a full review in these investigations in order
to be able to consider information excluded from the record because it was untimely
filed. Specifically, in both investigations, a response to our notice of institution filed
on behalf of a large domestic producer was rejected because it was filed one business
day late."
Anhydrous, supra note 98, at 1.
108. See Potassium Permanganate from Spain, supra note 91 (Statement of
Commission) (explaining its determinations on adequacy, which are available at
the Office of the Secretary, ITC, and at http://www.usitc.gov); Potassium Perman-
ganate from China, USITC Inv. No. 731-TA-125 (review initiated Nov. 1998).
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in grouped reviews with mixed respondent group responses can have
an ambiguous impact on domestic and foreign interests as well as on
the ITC. It unequivocally preserves the ability of the Commission to
cumulate subject imports in such multi-country grouped reviews."
Cumulation allows subject imports from each country to be consid-
ered collectively for purposes of assessing the likely effects of revo-
cation of the grouped orders, thus raising the likelihood of an af-
firmative determination resulting in continuation of the orders to the
benefit of domestic interested parties. Since cumulation is discretion-
ary in sunset reviews," the inclusion of the "mixed responses cir-
cumstance" suggests that the ITC at a minimum wants to preserve its
ability to invoke its discretion to consider cumulation.
Conducting full reviews when respondent group responses are
mixed in multi-country reviews will likely lead to, relative to expe-
dited reviews, greater participation by domestic and especially re-
spondent interested parties, as well as the collection of more infor-
mation for decision-making since the ITC conducts a detailed
investigation in a full review. Increased opportunities to participate
for respondent interested parties initially inclined to forgo participa-
tion might be beneficial to them by allowing an opportunity to recon-
sider their involvement. This opportunity to reconsider is not simi-
larly available to domestic interested parties, except in certain
grouped transition reviews, since this circumstance is only invoked
where an adequate domestic group response has been received, but
the adequacy of respondent group responses are mixed across re-
109. If one review in a multi-country grouped review is expedited and Com-
merce and the Commission determine that the order should be revoked, it is not
clear that "likely" imports from this country can be cumulated with "likely" im-
ports from the remaining countries in the subsequent full reviews. The statute
states that:
the Commission may cumulatively assess the volume and effect of imports of the
subject merchandise from all countries with respect to which reviews under section
751 (b) or (c) were initiated on the same day, if such imports would be likely to com-
pete with each other and with domestic like products in the United States market. The
Commission shall not cumulatively assess the volume and effects of imports of the
subject merchandise in a case in which it determines that such imports are likely to
have no discernible adverse impact on the domestic industry.
19 U.S.C. sec. 1675a(a)(7) (amended 1994).
110. See id. (stating that the Commission "may" cumulatively assess subject im-
ports).
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views in the group. Overall, increased opportunities to participate
and the collection of additional information, as well as a consistent
record for all reviews in a group, minimize the risk of successful le-
gal challenges to ITC determinations. For example, if the ITC splits
two grouped reviews and makes a final expedited determination to
revoke one order based on a minimal record and subsequently makes
an affirmative determination in the other review based on a broader
record collected in a full review, there could be some questions re-
garding the appropriateness of the ITC's decision to split the reviews
into expedited and full reviews.
The possibility that the Commission will normally conduct full re-
views for all orders in a grouped review even when only some, per-
haps even a minority, of the respondent group responses are adequate
will decrease the use of expedited reviews. Since grouped reviews
cover eighty-one percent of all transition orders, and, as an indicator
of the composition of future reviews, seventy-one percent of all new
orders imposed from 1995 through 1997 involved cumulated multi-
country cases,"' application of the "mixed responses circumstance"
significantly increases the likelihood that the Commission will con-
duct a large number of full reviews in cases where inadequate re-
sponses have been received."'
It remains to be seen whether conducting full reviews when re-
sponses in grouped reviews are mixed will promote administrative
efficiency. Conducting an expedited review involves little or no ad-
ditional compilation of new data by the ITC, while adding a country
to a full review incurs the additional expense of identifying addi-
tional interested parties and requesting and processing information
111. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Schedule of Sunset Reviews (visited Apr. 26,
1999) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/import-admin/records/sunset/workplan.htm> (pro-
viding information on data regarding transition orders); Featherstone Memoran-
dum, supra note 15 (regarding orders from 1995 through 1997).
112. As the ITC practices in this area become established, this policy may also
lead to a gaming process in which only one country's respondent interested parties
respond to the notice, with the expectation by respondent interested parties from
other countries in the group of orders that all the associated reviews will proceed to
a full review. In this manner, the "mixed response" policy can potentially lead to
an inequitable situation where the domestic industry must come forward in a fully
adequate group fashion, while foreign producers or United States importer groups
from only one country of the several grouped countries have to come forward in
order to proceed to a full review.
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from their involvement in all stages of a full review, including com-
pletion of questionnaires, participation at hearings, and general cor-
respondence. For the interested parties that did not show sufficient
interest in the review during the adequacy phase of the review-in-
cluding foreign producers and exporters and United States import-
ers-proceeding to a full review is likely to result in a higher bur-
den."
3
From the information presented in Tables 4 and 5 below, and from
recent statements by Commissioners,"4 it appears that the ITC in-
tends to regularly conduct full reviews when there are mixed re-
sponses in grouped reviews."5 As seen in Tables 4 and 5, there have
been three sets of grouped reviews involving twelve separate orders
among reviews initiated between July and December 1998.16 Of the
twelve separate reviews, the ITC determined that respondent groups
had responded inadequately in nine of them. Each grouped review,
however, included one review in which the ITC determined that the
respondent group was adequate. As a result, the ITC voted to con-
duct full reviews in all twelve reviews."'
113. In addition, when a case proceeds to a full review, United States importers
face possible subpoenas, which can force responses. See 19 U.S.C. sec. 1677f(7)
(1994) (authorizing ITC to issue subpoenas to United States importers to force re-
sponses). But cf H.R. DOC. 103-316, at 868 (1994) (stressing the importance of the
evaluation by the facts available given the incentive to respond to the ITC as op-
posed to subpoena power).
114. See, e.g., Potassium Permanganate from Spain, supra note 91, at 1 (state-
ment by the Commission) (explaining its decision to proceed with full reviews for
Potassium Permanganate from Spain and Potassium Permanganate from China,
despite an inadequate respondent group response in Potassium Permanganate from
China); Iron Construction Castings, supra note 73, at 1-3 (statement of the Com-
mission) (explaining its decision to proceed with full reviews for all investigations,
despite inadequate respondent group responses in three of the four grouped re-
views); Sugar from Five Countries, supra note 98, at 2 (statement of the Commis-
sion) (explaining the ITC's decision to proceed with full reviews for all sugar in-
vestigations based on mixed group responses and like product issues).
115. See infra Tables 4 and 5, at pp. 1320-23.
116. See Iron Constutction Castings, supra note 73 (involving five reviews);
Potassium Permanganate from Spain, supra note 91 (involving two reviews):
Sugar from Five Countries, supra note 98 (involving five reviews).
117. See infra Tables 4 and 5, at pp. 1320-23.
118. See id.
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The second circumstance in which the ITC has stated it may exer-
cise its discretion to conduct a full review notwithstanding inade-
quate group responses is when there are significant like product is-
sues. It is important that like product issues be considered carefully
in sunset reviews, since market conditions and decision-makers will
often have changed since the original determination or, in the case of
transition reviews, like products in reviews that have been grouped
together may be somewhat different. The "like product circum-
stance" has been invoked by the ITC in several recent adequacy de-
terminations involving differences in like products across reviews
that have been grouped together and where changes in the market
since the original order(s) were imposed have led some Commis-
sioners to believe that the original like product definition(s) may
have to be altered." 9 The basic rationale behind the "like product cir-
cumstance" is that, typically, there will be insufficient information
on the record in an expedited review to deviate significantly from the
like product and domestic industry definitions used in the original
investigation. Since changes in like product definitions can be out-
come dispositive, the belief is that it may be appropriate to proceed
to a full review where there are significant like product considera-
tions. Such a belief seems reasonable on its face but nevertheless
raises an important concern. 20 The like product issue represents an
119. See, e.g., Elemental Sulfur, supra note 21 (statement of Chairman Bragg)
(explaining her decision to proceed to a full review based on a fundamental ambi-
guity regarding the like product used in the original determination); Sugar from
Five Countries, supra note 98, at 1-3 (statement of the Commission). With Com-
missioners Crawford and Askey dissenting, the Commission majority's decision
was to proceed to a full investigation in all grouped reviews based in part on the
significant like product issues raised by the differences in like products among the
grouped reviews. See id.
120. It may be appropriate to proceed with a full review, for example, when the
Commission is contemplating a possible expansion of the original like product,
since an expansion of the like product to include other products can also lead to an
expansion of the class of domestic interested parties. Though such an expansion
would not be inconsistent with the statute, it might be damaging to domestic inter-
ested parties both by diluting the effect of imports and by the lack of notice to that
portion of the industry producing in the expanded part of the like product defini-
tion. A decision by the ITC to expand the like product in an expedited review
would not typically be made until the final determination is made. Since the ITC's
notice of initiation typically relies on the like product definition from the original
investigation, the "potential" domestic interested parties are not asked by the notice
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instance where the ITC has exercised its discretion to proceed to a
full review based on a perceived lack of information regarding what
the appropriate like product is, despite determining that one or both
groups responded inadequately. 2 ' Though perhaps appropriate in the
context of some like product questions, it raises the possibility that
discretion to proceed to a full review, notwithstanding a finding that
interested party responses are inadequate, will be exercised based on
a broader principle of the "need" for or likelihood of receiving addi-
tional information. This seems inappropriate since it is the lack of in-
formation, i.e., inadequate responses, that is the statutory premise for
conducting expedited reviews.'2 At least one Commissioner has
voted to proceed to a full review, notwithstanding inadequate group
responses, based on a perceived need for additional information un-
related to like product issues.'2 This appears to be the minority view,
to respond and, by not responding, are denied the right to review and comment.
Therefore, it is unlikely that the "newly created" domestic interested parties w-ill
have an opportunity to defend their interests in expedited review where the like
product is expanded. A decision to proceed to a full review, while not eliminating
this problem, allows for additional time to consider like product questions and for
potential domestic interested parties to submit information and participate.
121. The Commission's Notice of Institution contains only an optional like
product question requesting that responding parties state whether they agree with
the original definition of domestic like product and domestic industry, and if not,
explain why and provide alternative definitions. No provision is made to provide
data for alternative definitions. See ITC, Rules of Procedure and Practice, supra
note 6, 63 Fed. Reg. at 30,610 (stating that the Commission's Notice of Institution
contains only an optional question requesting that responding parties state whether
they agree -with the original definition of domestic like product and the domestic
industry).
122. Under the statutory scheme and the legislative history, interested parties
must show a sufficient willingness to participate and to submit requested informa-
tion to warrant a full review. See discussion supra Part II. If interested parties pro-
vide inadequate responses, it is an indication that they do not have sufficient inter-
est in a particular review to warrant conducting a full review. In these
circumstances, the Commission would logically be expected to conduct an expe-
dited review. Although the possibility exists that the Commission would obtain
more information if it conducts a full review, it is the lack of information due to
inadequate responses that is the premise for conducting an expedited review.
123. See Greige Polyester Printcloth from China, supra note 94, at I (statement
of Commissioner Koplan). Commissioner Koplan believed that conducting a full
review would better enable him to assess the likely impact of a textile trade agree-
ment between China and the United States if the order were revoked and would
help resolve any apparent discrepancies concerning the volume of subject imports.
See id. In two other reviews:
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however, since in each such instance, the majority has voted to pro-
ceed to an expedited review."'
An examination of ITC adequacy voting patterns shows that the
ITC has been in greater disagreement, relative to individual and
group adequacy determinations, over when to expedite a review
when one or both groups have provided inadequate responses. As
shown in Table 5 above, for all reviews initiated between July 1998
through December 1998, there are twenty instances in which a ma-
jority of Commissioners have determined that the respondent group
response was inadequate.' 25 The Commission resolved to expedite the
review based on the inadequate respondent group response in ten of
twenty instances, seven of which were unanimous votes. 26 In the re-
maining ten instances, however, the Commission voted to proceed to
a full review, in divided votes in each instance, despite the inade-
quate respondent group response. On the domestic side, the Commis-
sion found domestic group responses to be inadequate in five re-
views.' 27 One of these reviews was expedited on a divided vote. The
other four reviews proceeded to full reviews on evenly split votes.
Overall, the ITC has expedited ten of thirty-one reviews, nine of
which were based on respondent inadequacy and one on inadequate
responses by both groups. Of the twenty-one ITC reviews that pro-
ceeded to full reviews, the ITC found that ten of them had inadequate
responses by one or both groups.
Commerce has expedited twenty-six of the thirty-two reviews pro-
ceeding beyond the initial review stage, all of which were, by virtue
of Commerce's procedures, based on respondent group inade-
[Commissioner Koplan] voted to conduct a full review in these investigations in order
to be able to consider information excluded from the record because it was untimely
filed. Specifically, in both investigations, a response to our notice of institution filed
on behalf of a large domestic producer was rejected because it was filed one business
day late.
Sorbitol, supra note 78, at 1; Anhydrous, supra note 98, at 1 (statement of Com-
missioner Stephen Koplan) (explaining his view on adequacy for this case and
Sorbitol).
124. See id; see also supra Tables 4 and 5, at pp. 1320-23.
125. See supra Table 5, at pp. 1322-23.
126. See id.
127. See supra Table 4, at pp. 1320-21.
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quacy.' Thus far, there has not been an instance where Commerce
proceeded with a full review for its portion of the investigation and
the ITC decided to expedite its portion.
29
Finally, the adequacy voting structure adopted by the ITC in-
creases the likelihood of proceeding to full reviews. Under the three-
stage system, a Commissioner's vote to expedite a review based on a
given group's inadequacy only counts if it is part of a majority of
Commissioners that agree on the inadequacy of that particular group
response."O This structural bias is best illustrated in the adequacy
voting data, as presented in Table 2 above. Table 2 indicates that the
Commission as a whole has voted to expedite fifty percent of those
cases in which it found one or both groups inadequate. An examina-
tion of individual Commissioner votes, however, shows that Com-
missioners voted to expedite in seventy-five percent of the cases in
which they found one or both groups to be inadequate."'
128. See supra Table 3, at 1305.
129. Such a scenario would create a dilemma for the ITC, since it would have to
base its final determination without the benefit of a "likelihood of dumping" find-
ing by Commerce.
130. The statute and legislative history provide no direction regarding tie votes
on the decision to expedite. Absent guidance, the Commission has adopted the
practice that a majority of the Commission must be in agreement to vote to expe-
dite based on inadequacy of one or both groups. For example, if three Commis-
sioners vote to expedite a review based on domestic group inadequacy only, and
the other three Commissioners vote to expedite based on respondent group inade-
quacy only, this review fails to meet the majority required to expedite the review,
despite a total of six votes to expedite. Only if four Commissioners agree as to a
particular group's inadequacy and vote to proceed to an expedited review based on
that group's inadequacy can a review be expedited. See supra note 100 (describing
the Commission's voting practices).
131. There has been some disagreement among Commissioners at the ITC as to
how to implement the adequacy voting at the ITC. The ITC settled on a three-stage
approach. Two Commissioners, however, have openly questioned whether the
adequacy assessment procedures adopted by the ITC are an accurate reflection of
the statute. In Elemental Sulfur, Commissioner Askey notes that "the group ade-
quacy approach adopted by the Commission to decide whether or not interested
party responses are adequate to warrant full sunset review is not suggested by the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) or the Statement of Administrative Ac-
tion (SAA)." Elemental Sulfur, supra note 21, at 5 n.5. Commissioner Crawford
"concurs with Commissioner Askey that the multi-step 'group inadequacy' voting
process recently adopted by the Commission to decide whether to expedite a re-
view does not reflect the statute." Id. at 5 n.6. Both Commissioners believe the
relevant decision is whether or not to expedite a review. By requiring a sequential
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V. EVALUATION OF ADEQUACY PRACTICES AT
COMMERCE AND THE ITC
Although both agencies are under the guidance of the same statu-
tory language, there are stark differences in how the two agencies
have chosen to implement their adequacy determinations and in the
transparency of their respective processes. The ITC has vague crite-
ria for assessing individual adequacy, but has relatively clear criteria
for assessing group adequacy and for deciding when to conduct a full
review in spite of an inadequate group response finding. The ITC
places roughly the same information burdens on individual domestic
and respondent interested parties, and uses the same basic criteria
and thresholds for its analysis of each group's adequacy.'32 It does
not render automatic judgments under any stated circumstances and
has no discernible burden of persuasion on either interested party
group at the adequacy stage. Though some ITC practices can be
viewed as favoring one side or the other, there is no pattern of une-
qual treatment.
133
three-stage voting procedure, a Commissioner may not be able to exercise his or
her right to vote to proceed to an expedited review unless he or she is in a group of
majority Commissioners finding a particular group response to be inadequate.
132. During the ITC's rulemaking comment process, some commentators that
have traditionally represented domestic interests before the ITC expressed their
interest in a two-stage system for submitting information in ITC reviews which are
ultimately expedited. See Comments on the Commission's Notice of Proposed
Rules, Dec. 22, 1997, submitted by Eugene L. Stewart of Stewart & Stewart, at 9-
11; Rebuttal Comments Regarding the Commission's Notice of Proposed Rules,
Jan. 22, 1998, submitted by Eugene L. Stewart of Stewart and Stewart, at 6-7.
They proposed that interested parties be allowed to submit an abbreviated response
to the notice of institution, and if the Commission decides to expedite the review,
submit more detailed responses with data relevant to final review determinations.
This was rejected by the ITC in favor of a schedule that creates incentives for par-
ties to disclose early in the process their willingness to participate in a given re-
view. This single submission mechanism prevents parties from manipulating the
system by sandbagging opponents. One observer, however, has noted that the sys-
tem chosen by the ITC might be inconsistent with the United States' WTO obliga-
tions. See Larry Walders, Transcript of The Past and Future of Sunset in Anti-
Dumping, in SHEDDING LIGHT ON ANTIDUMPING, supra note 23, at 62. Walders
notes that expedited review procedures which cut off the ability of parties to pres-
ent information that is relevant to a decision on revocation may in effect deny a
member country its right to a full sunset review. See id.
133. Some ITC practices can work in favor of respondent interested parties. For
example, invocation of the mixed responses circumstance in grouped reviews pro-
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Commerce provides relatively less guidance regarding its analysis
of adequacy. It has one stated criterion for assessing individual ade-
quacy and simple criteria for group adequacy. There is, however, no
guidance as to its exercise of discretion in conducting either an expe-
dited or full review when the respondent group response is inade-
quate beyond the "normally proceed to an expedited review" lan-
guage. Commerce places highly unbalanced information burdens on
domestic and respondent interested parties, and uses different criteria
and thresholds for its analysis of the adequacy of each group's re-
sponses. The Commerce procedures also raise a question regarding
whether there is some form of a burden of persuasion on one side or
the other in sunset reviews, since the consequences of not responding
to Commerce's notice of initiation are different for most domestic
and respondent interested parties.
There are only two circumstances in which the statute sanctions
automatic judgments against interested parties in sunset reviews. The
first is an automatic judgment by Commerce against domestic inter-
ested parties when there is no initial response by any domestic inter-
ested party."M The second is an automatic judgment by Commerce
against respondent interested parties that elect to file "waiver of par-
ticipation" notices with Commerce." ' Commerce's interim rules,
vides non-responding respondent interested parties with an opportunity to avoid an
expedited review in which their interests are not represented. Moreover, ITC rules
in one sense give more chances to respondents, since United States importer, ex-
porter, or foreign producer groups can all respond independently on behalf of re-
spondents, whereas domestic interested parties have essentially two options: pro-
ducers or workers representing production. On the other hand, there are advantages
to domestic interested parties as well. Domestic unions can serve as proxies for
producers, without the same information burdens to the extent the requested data is
not available to them. Further, it could be argued that equal requests from domestic
and respondent interested parties for purposes of assessing adequacy is not entirely
appropriate since foreign producers are typically not required to provide as much
information as their domestic counterparts, e.g., financial data, in full reviews.
134. See 19 U.S.C. sec. 1675(c)(3)(A) (amended 1994) (stating that if no do-
mestic interested party responds to the notice of initiation, Commerce will revoke
the order). Commerce considers inadequate substantive domestic responses and, at
Commerce's discretion, responses by related parties to be equivalent to no re-
sponse. See supra note 63.
135. See 19 U.S.C. sec. 1675(c)(4)(B) (amended 1994) (stating that if any re-
spondent interested party waives its participation, Commerce shall make an af-
firmative determination -with respect to that respondent interested party). Com-
merce regulations pertaining to sunset reviews state that any respondent interested
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however, expand the application of such automatic judgments or pre-
sumptions against respondent interests to areas outside those pro-
vided by the statute and, in one instance, the legislative history. First,
when a respondent interested party fails to respond at all or fails to
provide an individually adequate, substantive response to its notice,
Commerce treats the lack of a response from that respondent inter-
ested party as equivalent to a waiver of participation and therefore
makes an automatic affirmative judgment with respect to that re-
spondent interested party. '36 The end result is that anything less than
a substantially complete individual response by a respondent inter-
ested party results in an automatic judgment against that party. Nei-
ther the statute nor the legislative history directs Commerce to en-
gage in such a practice. Second, consistent with the legislative
history,'37 Commerce interim rules state that Commerce will "nor-
mally" render an affirmative judgment against all respondent inter-
ested parties in a countervailing duty review if the relevant foreign
government fails to respond adequately or at all. This rule is applied
even if all respondent interested parties, except the foreign govern-
ment, file individually adequate responses with Commerce. 3 They
are treated as if they had not responded at all. 9 Domestic interested
parties have the right to "waive" their participation in a sunset review before
Commerce. See 19 C.F.R. pt. 351.218(d)(2)(i) (1998).
136. See 19 C.F.R. pt. 351.218(d)(2)(iii) (1998).
137. See H.R. DOc. No. 103-316 (1994), at 881; S. REP. No. 103-412, at 46
(1994); H.R. REP. No. 103-826, at 57 (1994).
138. See 19 C.F.R. pt. 351.218(d)(2)(iv) (1998) (explaining the effects of vari-
ous responses to initiation of sunset review by parties). Commerce states that if a
foreign government waives participation, whether explicitly by letter or implicitly
by an inadequate or no response, Commerce will "normally" make an affirmative
determination for all respondent interested parties. Thus, even if all non-
government respondent interested parties respond adequately in a countervailing
duty review, Commerce will normally make an affirmative finding against all of
them if the foreign government does not respond adequately. See id. (explaining
adequacy requirements for respondent interested parties and the foreign govern-
ment and the effects of their responses on the outcome of the adequacy finding). In
those exceptional CVD cases where the foreign government does not respond and
an automatic judgment is not immediately rendered, Commerce is instructed to ig-
nore all information provided by any responding respondent interested parties and
to "rely on evidence provided by the domestic industry." H.R. Doc. No. 103-316,
at 880 (1994).
139. It is not clear whether such automatic judgments against respondent inter-
ested parties are contemplated under the WTO Antidumping Agreement. Nowhere
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parties face no such catch all provisions or automatic adverse judg-
ments, as long as at least one responds with an initial notice of intent
to participate and at least one subsequently submits a substantive re-
sponse."' The relative treatment by Commerce of domestic and re-
spondent interested parties, although in part consistent with the Stat-
ute and the legislative history, may provide some basis for the
criticism often heard among outside observers that Commerce's pro-
cedures are sometimes biased in favor of the domestic industry.' It
is not clear that respondent interested parties gain very much by par-
ticipating in Commerce reviews and avoiding automatic judgments.
The statute, the legislative history, and Commerce rules make it
highly likely that Commerce will find a likelihood of dumping and
will simply rely on the results of the original investigation." Com-
merce will probably arrive at the same conclusions regardless of for-
eign participation.141 In light of this and the high information burden
in the WTO Antidumping Agreement does it state that agencies may make auto-
matic judgments against non-responding or, for that matter, responding parties in
sunset reviews. Both the WTO Antidumping Agreement and the statute provide for
judgments against interested parties based on the facts available in a review, which
under United States law includes the use of the "adverse inferences" clause under
the United States statute, if an interested party does not provide necessary infor-
mation. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994, supra note 12, arts. 6.6, 6.8, 11.4; 19 U.S.C. sec.
1675(c)(3)(B) (1994); 19 U.S.C. sec. 1677e (amended 1994). This is not, however,
license to render automatic judgment. Even judgments based on "facts available"
require analysis of those facts before rendering judgment.
140. The WTO Antidumping Agreement does not impose a burden of proof on
either side in reviews that are self-initiated by "the authorities" (national govern-
ments). In contrast, when a review is requested by any interested party, it must
submit "positive information substantiating the need for a review." Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994, supra note 12, art. 11.2. Section 751(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930 as amended
(Changed Circumstances Reviews) satisfies the latter obligation. See 19 U.S.C.
sec. 1675b (amended 1994).
141. See, e.g., Down in the Dumps, ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNFAIR TRADE
LAWS (Richard Boltuck and Robert Litan eds., 1991)
142. See 19 C.F.Rt pt. 351.218(e)(2)(i) (1998) ("[O]nly under the most extraor-
dinary circumstances will the Secretary [of Commerce] rely on a countervailing
duty rate or a dumping margin other than those it calculated and published in its
prior determinations.").
143. See Michael 0. Moore & Michael H. Stein, The Past and Future of Sunset
in Anti-Dumping, in SHEDDING LIGHT ON ANTIDUMPING, supra note 23, at 1 (ex-
plaining that there are only a few circumstances in which Commerce could make a
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on respondent interested parties,'" there is a clear incentive for re-
spondent interested parties to forego participation at Commerce. In
fact, most respondent interested parties have simply not responded in
the majority of reviews initiated to date. As can be seen in Table 1,
only nine responses from respondent interested parties have been re-
ceived to date. 145
CONCLUSION
There are several major points that emerge in this article. First,
while there are structural similarities in the general approach each
agency takes in assessing adequacy, there are significant differences
in their application. Second, the ITC rules and practices are biased in
favor of proceeding to full reviews while Commerce practices are bi-
ased in favor of proceeding to expedited reviews. Commerce has ex-
pedited two-and-one-half times as many reviews as the ITC. Third,
the evidence suggests that the standards for individual adequacy are
relatively easy to meet at both agencies. Both agencies have found
negative finding).
144. One participant at the Brookings Conference commented that the agencies
are likely to impose large information burdens on the parties "in the hope that the
parties will decide that it is too expensive." See Michael Stein, Transcript of The
Past and Future of Sunset in Anti-Dumping, in SHEDDING LIGHT ON
ANTIDUMPING, supra note 23, at 18. In his prepared remarks delivered at the No-
vember 1997 Brookings Conference, Michael H. Stein stated that the sunset provi-
sion makes antidumping investigations more expensive and discourages use of the
antidumping statute by domestic parties. See Outline of Remarks, in SHEDDING
LIGHT ON ANTIDUMPING, supra note 23, at 1. Another option for respondent inter-
ested parties seeking revocation of an order by Commerce is to request periodic
reviews by Commerce of dumping margins. If Commerce finds zero margins for
three years in a row, as well as the far more difficult to meet test of "no likelihood
that dumping will recur," then the order may be revoked. Otherwise, the order re-
mains in place. In contrast, in sunset reviews Commerce must demonstrate that
there is a likelihood that dumping will continue or recur, otherwise the order is re-
voked. The "no likelihood" standard would appear to be a higher standard than
"likelihood of dumping" in the sense that "no likelihood" is more difficult to
prove. In practice, given the procedural biases described above, sunset reviews at
Commerce may lead to relatively fewer revocations, notwithstanding the lower
"likelihood of dumping" standard.
145. The overall differences in the sunset review procedures between Commerce
and the ITC are in part why several participants at a November 1997 conference
discussing the then-upcoming sunset reviews said that the ITC is "where the action
is going to be." Transcript of The Past and Future of Sunset in Anti-Dumping, in
SHEDDING LIGHT ON ANTIDUMPING, supra note 23, at 19, 29, 87.
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nearly all responses by domestic and respondent interested parties to
be adequate to date. Fourth, both agencies have adopted numerical
thresholds for representation of responses as the primary focus of
their group adequacy analyses. Moreover, where parties have re-
sponded, both agencies have found most group responses to be ade-
quate. Fifth, the ITC appears to have relatively balanced practices in
assessing the adequacy of domestic and respondent interested party
responses, while Commerce practices appear to favor the domestic
industry. Sixth, expedited reviews at both agencies have been based
primarily on respondent group inadequacy. At the ITC, Commission-
ers have been less than unanimous in their determinations whether to
expedite or proceed with a full review when one or both group re-
sponses are found to be inadequate. Of the ten reviews expedited by
the ITC, nine were based upon respondent group adequacy alone and
the tenth on inadequate responses by both groups. Alternatively,
Commerce has expedited every review in which it has found the re-
spondent group response to be inadequate. Seventh, there is a lack of
full transparency at Commerce and to a lesser extent at the ITC re-
garding their adequacy practices which creates uncertainty for parties
attempting to participate in sunset reviews. Finally, the early rates of
revocation have been fairly high, but are slowing down as the oldest
orders are cleared out.'4
146. By comparison, Canada's overall revocation rate in its sunset reviews by
the Canadian International Trade Tribunal ("CITT") when it first started its re-
views in the 1980s was about fifty percent, but later dropped to about thirty percent
a year. See Transcript of The Past and Future of Sunset in Anti-Dumping, supra
note 145, at 231 (comments of Kathleen MacMillan). Even higher rates of "sunset"
revocations, seventy-three percent, were reported by another historically large user
of antidumping laws, the European Union. See id.; Horlick, supra note 23, at 5-7
(discussing the occurrence rates of sunset reviews).
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